孫子の兵法
SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR 


THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD 
Translated from the Chinese 
By LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1910)



一・作戦を立てる
I.  LAYING PLANS


[Ts`ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent.  See. ss. 26.]


１．孫子は言いました。
1.  Sun Tzu said:

「兵法は国家にとってたいへん重要なものです。
The art of war is of vital importance to the State.

２．生きるか死ぬかを決めるような問題であり、平和か破滅かの分かれ道でもあります。
2.  It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin.

だから、ぜったいに無視できない研究対象なのです。
Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.

３．さて、兵法というものは必ず五つの基本的な要項によって決定されるものであり、戦場で情勢を理解しようとするときには、よくよく考慮に入れなければいけません。
3.  The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors,  to be taken into account in one's deliberations,  when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.

４．その五つとは（１）徳のある法律（２）天意（３）地の利（４）指揮官（５）作戦と規律のことです。
4.  These are:  (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven;  (3)  Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.


[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzu means by  "Moral Law" a principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its moral aspect.  One might be tempted to render it by  "morale," were it not considered as an attribute of the ruler in ss. 13.]


５、６．（１）国に徳のある法律が施行されていれば、兵士たちみんなは国主と完璧に一体となって、自分たちの死をも顧みずに彼に従い、どんな危険にもめげることはありません。
5,  6.  The MORAL LAW causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.


[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying:   
"Without constant practice,  the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; 
without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."]


７．（２）天意は夜と昼の変化、寒さや暑さ、時と季節の移ろいなどの自然の秩序にその兆しを現します。
7.  HEAVEN signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.


[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words here.  
Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of Heaven.  
Wang Hsi, however, may be right in saying that what is meant is "the general economy of Heaven," including the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.]


８．（３）地面は距離、大きいものと小さいもの、つまり危険と安全、すなわち開けた土地と狭い小道、ということはつまり生きるチャンスと死の機会とで出来ているものです。
8.  EARTH comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.

９．（４）指揮官とは知恵、誠実さ、慈悲深さ、勇気、厳格さという道徳的美点を備えた人のことです。
9.  The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness.


[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1)  humanity or benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect,  self-control,  or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith.  
Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or benevolence,"  and the two military virtues of  "courage"  and "strictness"  substituted for "uprightness of mind"  and  "self-respect, self-control, or 'proper feeling.'"]


１０．（５）作戦と規律を用いるというのは、部隊の適切な部署割り、将校の階級の等級付け、物資を軍に供給するための補給路の整備、軍事費の制御ということだと理解されなくてはなりません。
10.  By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.

１１．この五つはおよそ将軍たる者はみな熟知していなけれなばりません。
11.  These five heads should be familiar to every general:

これに通じている者が勝利を収めるのです。
he who knows them will be victorious;

そして、このことを知らない者は負けてしまうでしょう。
he who knows them not will fail.

１２．それゆえ、自軍の状況を判断しようと考える際には、次のようなやり方を比較の基準にしましょう。
12.  Therefore,  in your deliberations,  when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise: --

１３．（１）どちらの君主が善政を敷いていますか？
13.  (1)   Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?


[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects."  Cf. ss. 5.]


　　　（２）どちらの将軍がより有能ですか？
     (2)  Which of the two generals has most ability?

　　　（３）天の利、地の利はどちらにありますか？
     (3)  With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?


[See ss. 7,8]


　　　（４）どちらがより厳格な規律のもとにありますか？
     (4)  On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?


[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts`ao Ts`ao  (A.D. 155-220),  who was such a strict disciplinarian that once,  in accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed him horse to shy into a field of corn!  
However,  in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by cutting off his hair.  
Ts`ao Ts`ao's own comment on the present passage is characteristically curt:  
"when you lay down a law,  see that it is not disobeyed; 
if it is disobeyed the offender must be put to death."]


　　　（５）どちらの軍隊が強いですか？
     (5)  Which army is stronger?


[Morally as well as physically.  As Mei Yao-ch`en puts it, freely rendered, "ESPIRIT DE CORPS and 'big battalions.'"]


　　　（６）どちらの士卒がよりしっかり訓練されていますか？
     (6)  On which side are officers and men more highly trained?


[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying:   
"Without constant practice,  the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; 
without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."]


　　　（７）どちらの軍隊で賞罰が公明に行われていますか？
     (7)   In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?


[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?]


１４．この七つの考察でもって勝利か敗北かを前もって知ることができます。
14.  By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.

１５．私の助言に耳を傾け、それに従って行動する将軍は勝ちます。
15.  The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer:

そんな人物を雇いましょう！
--let such a one be retained in command!

私の助言に耳を傾けず、それに従って行動しない将軍は一敗地にまみれます。
The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it,  will suffer defeat:

そんな将軍は解雇してしまいなさい！
--let such a one be dismissed!


[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's treatise was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu State.]


１６．私の助言の利益を受けると同時に、普通の作戦に加えていかなる有用な状況をも利用しなさい。
16.  While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.

１７．有利な状況に応じて作戦は変更していかなければなりません。
17.  According as circumstances are favorable,  one should modify one's plans.


[Sun Tzu,  as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish theoric."  
He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; 
"for," 
as Chang Yu puts it, 
"while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a favorable position in actual warfare."  
On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry,  went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because,  as he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment.  
The Duke listened quietly and then said:  
"Who will attack the first tomorrow -- I or Bonaparte?"  
"Bonaparte," 
replied Lord Uxbridge.
"Well," 
continued the Duke, 
"Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; 
and as my plans will depend upon his,  how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?" [1] ]


１８．あらゆる戦争は騙し合いです。（兵とは詭道なり）
18.  All warfare is based on deception.


[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every soldier.  
Col.  Henderson tells us that Wellington,  great in so many military qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe."]


１９．ゆえに、攻めることが出来るなら、出来ないと見せかけなければならず、
19.  Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;  

軍事力を用いるときには動かないと見せかけなければいけません。
when using our forces, we must seem inactive; 

すなわち、敵の近くにいるときには敵に遠くにいると思わせ、
when we are near,  we must make the enemy believe we are far away; 

遠くにいるときには、近くにいると思わせるのです。
when far away,  we must make him believe we are near.

２０．敵をおびき寄せるために餌をまいておきなさい。
20.  Hold out baits to entice the enemy.

混乱していると装い、それから叩きつぶすのです。
Feign disorder, and crush him.


[All commentators,  except Chang Yu, say, 
"When he is in disorder, crush him."  
It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu is still illustrating the uses of deception in war.]


２１．あらゆる点で相手が難攻不落なら、攻めてくるのに備えなさい。
21.  If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him.  

相手が優勢であれば、回避しなさい。
If he is in superior strength, evade him.

２２．敵が怒りっぽいのであれば、いらつかせてやりなさい。
22.  If your opponent is of choleric temper,  seek to irritate him.

こちらが弱いふりをしていれば相手は尊大になるでしょう。
Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.


[Wang Tzu,  quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse,  first feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.]


２３．相手が楽にしているのであれば、休む暇を与えてはいけません。
23.  If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.


[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch`en has the note:  
"while we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out."  
The YU LAN has 
"Lure him on and tire him out."]


結束が固ければ、分裂させてやりなさい。
If his forces are united, separate them.


[Less plausible is the interpretation favored by most of the commentators:   
"If sovereign and subject are in accord,  put division between them."]


２４．備えのないところから攻め、予期せぬところから姿を現しましょう。
24.  Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

２５．勝つためのこれらの軍事作戦は事前に漏らしてはいけません。
25.  These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.

２６．戦いに勝つ将軍はやがて起きる戦争を頭の中で何度も計算します。
26.   Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.


[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.]


負ける将軍は事前に少ししか計算をしません。
The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand.

このように、数多く計算することは勝利に繋がり、少ししか計算しないことは敗北に繋がるのです。
Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat:

ましてや全く計算しないよりはるかにましです！
how much more no calculation at all! 

この点を注意して見ることで私はどちらが勝ちそうでどちらが負けそうかを見極めるのです」
It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.


[1]  "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser.



二・戦争の遂行
II.  WAGING WAR


[Ts`ao Kung has the note:  
"He who wishes to fight must first count the cost," 
which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.]


１．孫子は言いました。
1.  Sun Tzu said:

「戦争をするにあたっては、千の戦車にそれと同数の重戦車、千里の行軍に十分な糧秣を備えた十万の武装した兵士、
In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,

[The  "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, used for the attack; 
the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed for purposes of defense.  
Li Ch`uan, it is true, says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly probable.
It is interesting to note the analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks.  
In each case, the war-chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of foot-soldiers.  
With regard to the numbers given here, we are informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen,  so that the whole army would be divided up into a thousand battalions,  each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.]

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand LI,


[2.78 modern LI go to a mile.  
The length may have varied slightly since Sun Tzu's time.]


外交使節を迎える費用、膠や漆のような細々とした物品、戦車と武具の維持費を含む本陣と前線の軍事費は、総額で一日に銀千オンスにのぼります。
the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.

十万の軍勢を出陣させるにはこれほどの費用がかかってしまうのです。
Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

２．実際の戦闘に臨んで、勝利を得るのに時間がかかってしまうと、兵卒の武器はなまくらになり、その勢いはそがれてしまいます。
2.  When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped.

都市を包囲して闘うなら、自軍の優勢を使い果たしてしまうでしょう。
If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.

３．繰り返します。
3.  Again,

もし軍事行動が長引いてしまえば、自国の資源は使い果たされたも同然となってしまうのです。
if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.

４．ですから、あなたの武器は切れ味がなくなり、兵卒は勢いをそがれ、優位性は使い果たされ、財産は浪費してしまったとなれば、諸侯はあなたの窮地につけこむために飛びかかってくるでしょう。
4.  Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. 

そうなれば、いかに賢い人であっても、その後に続く事態を避けることはできません。
Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

５．ゆえに、戦争においては愚かな迅速さというのはあっても、長く時間をかけてしまうことに賢さが見受けられるなどということは決してないのです。
5.  Thus,  though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.


[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the commentators.  
Ts`ao Kung, Li Ch`uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity.  
Ho Shih says:  
"Haste may be stupid,  but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and treasure;  
protracted operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in their train."  
Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking:   
"Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the people;  
true cleverness insures against the occurrence of such calamities."   
Chang Yu says:   
"So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness."
Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy operations.  
What he does say is something much more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish
--if only because it means impoverishment to the nation.  
In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzu, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind.  
That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibals's isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a strange country.  
But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long run.  
Their reversal it is true, led to Cannae; 
but this only establishes a negative presumption in their favor.]


６．長引く戦役から利益を得た国の例などありません。
6.  There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

７．戦争の悪弊に完全に通じている者だけが、戦端を開くことで利益を得る方法の全てを理解できるのです。
7.  It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.


[That is, with rapidity.  
Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close.  
Only two commentators seem to favor this interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of the context,  whereas the rendering, 
"He who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits,"  
is distinctly pointless.]


８．優れた兵隊は二度目の徴兵には応じず、また食料運搬車を三度も満載にしたりはしません。
8.  The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.


[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy's frontier without delay.
This may seem an audacious policy to recommend,  but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time 
-- that is, being a little ahead of your opponent 
-- has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.]


９．軍需物資は国から持って行きましょう。
9.  Bring war material with you from home, 

でも食糧は敵方のものを。
but forage on the enemy.  

こうして軍隊は自分たちに必要な食べ物を手に入れるのです。
Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.


[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means "things to be used", and is meant in the widest sense.  
It includes all the impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.]


１０．国庫が窮乏すれば、軍勢は遠方からの財政負担によって維持されることになります。
10.  Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance.

遠方の軍勢を維持するために財政負担するとなると、国民は貧窮するのです。
Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.


[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next, though obviously intended to do so.   
The arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text.  
It never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense, and we get no help from them there.  
The Chinese words Sun Tzu used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment clearly have reference to some system by which the husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct.  
But why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because the State or Government is too poor to do so?]


１１．その一方で、軍隊が近隣にいることは物価を上昇させてしまいます。
11.  On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up;

そして、物価高は国民の資産を奪い取ってしまいます。
and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away.


[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own territory.  
Ts`ao Kung understands it of an army that has already crossed the frontier.]


１２．国民の資産が奪われると、農民たちは重い年貢の取り立てに苦しむことになるでしょう。
12.  When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

１３，１４．このような資産の喪失と意気阻喪によって、人々の家々はすっかり丸裸にされ、収入の三分の一が失われてしまうでしょう。
13,  14.  With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;


[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10, but of 7/10, of their income.  
But this is hardly to be extracted from our text.  
Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: 
"The PEOPLE being regarded as the essential part of the State, and FOOD as the people's heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and be careful of both?"]


一方で政府も、戦車の修繕費用や疲れた馬、胸当てや兜、弓矢、槍や楯、鎧、運搬用の牛、大型車両のための出費が歳入の四分の一にまでなってしまうのです。
while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

１５．だからこそ、賢い将軍は敵の糧秣を狙うのです。
15.  Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy.

敵の食糧一台分は自軍の食糧二十台分に相当します。
One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own,

また同じように相手方の飼い葉一担はこちら側の備蓄分の二十担分に値します。
and likewise a single PICUL of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.


[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting one cartload to the front.  
A PICUL is a unit of measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).]


１６．敵を殺すにあたっては、自軍は怒りにまかせた状態にあります。
16.  Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger;

兵士は敵を倒すことで褒賞をもらえるに違いないからです。
that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.


[Tu Mu says:  
"Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy; 
thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account."]


１７．それに対し、戦車戦では、十台かそれ以上の戦車を捕獲した場合、最初に捕らえた者にはかならず恩賞を与えましょう。
17.  Therefore in chariot fighting,  when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first.

味方の旗を敵の旗と取り替え、自軍のと混ぜて一緒に使わなければいけません。
Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy,  and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours.

捕らえた敵兵は親切に遇して手元に置いておきましょう。
The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

１８．これが征服した敵を使って自軍の力を増すということです。
18.  This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength.

１９．戦争においては、最大の目的は長引く作戦行動ではなく、勝つことに定めましょう。
19.  In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.


[As Ho Shih remarks:  
"War is not a thing to be trifled with."   
Sun Tzu here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce."]


２０．というわけで、軍を率いる者は国民の運命を握る、国の安泰か危機かを左右する存在なのです。
20.  Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.


三・計略を用いて攻撃する
III.  ATTACK BY STRATAGEM

１．孫子は言いました。
1.  Sun Tzu said:

「実践的な兵法では、何よりもいいのは敵の国をそっくりそのまま無傷で頂いてしまうことです。
In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; 

散々に破壊してしまうのは上策ではありません。
to shatter and destroy it is not so good.

ですから、それと同じように敵兵を捕虜にする方が撃滅するよりもよくて、敵の分隊や連隊、中隊を捕らえる方が殲滅してしまうよりもいいのです。
So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.


[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted nominally of 12500 men; 
according to Ts`ao Kung, the equivalent of a regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists from any number between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company contains from 5 to 100 men.  
For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5 respectively.]


２．したがって、戦争の間中ずっと闘って相手を征服するのは最上のことではありません。
2.  Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence;

最上の策とは、闘わずに相手の抵抗をなくしてしまうことにあるのです。
supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.


[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old Chinese general.  
Moltke's greatest triumph, the capitulation of the huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.]


３．用兵術の最高の形は、敵の作戦をくじいてしまうことです。
3.  Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans;


[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defense, whereby one might be content to foil the enemy's stratagems one after another, but an active policy of counter-attack.  
Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note:  
"When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by delivering our own attack first."]


次善は敵の軍隊の連携を断ち切ってしまうことで、
the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces;


[Isolating him from his allies.  
We must not forget that Sun Tzu, in speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or principalities into which the China of his day was split up.]


その次によいのが戦場で敵を攻撃すること、
the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field;


[When he is already at full strength.]


そして最悪の手段が城塞都市の包囲戦です。
and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

４．もし可能ならば城塞化された都市への攻撃は避けるのが常道です。
4.  The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.


[Another sound piece of military theory.  
Had the Boers acted upon it in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would have been masters of the situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose them.]


防楯や城攻め用の車輌、それからさまざまな武具を準備するのに丸々三ヶ月はかかってしまいます。
The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months;


[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as "mantlets", described.  
Ts`ao Kung simply defines them as "large shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch`uan, who says they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city walls at close quarters.  
This seems to suggest a sort of Roman TESTUDO, ready made.  
Tu Mu says they were wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks,  but this is denied by Ch`en Hao.  
See supra II. 14.  
The name is also applied to turrets on city walls.  
Of the "movable shelters" we get a fairly clear description from several commentators.  
They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels,  propelled from within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat with earth.  
Tu Mu adds that they are now called "wooden donkeys."]


そして防壁を越える土塁を積み上げるのにさらに三ヶ月かかってしまうでしょう。
and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.


[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy's walls in order to discover the weak points in the defense, and also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note.]


５．もし将軍が自分の怒気をコントロールできないような場合は、自軍の兵士たちをまるでアリの群のように強襲させてしまい、
5.  The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,


[This vivid simile of Ts`ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants climbing a wall.  
The meaning is that the general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his engines of war are ready.]


その結果、自軍の三分の一が死傷したのに相手方の城塞はまだ陥落しないなどという羽目になってしまいます。
with the result that one-third of his men are slain,  while the town still remains untaken.

これが攻城戦の害悪です。
Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.


[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record.]


６．それに対して、有能な指揮官は敵の大群を闘わずして捕捉してしまいます。
6.  Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting;

城塞を囲むことなく陥落させ、
he captures their cities without laying siege to them; 

戦場で長期間戦闘することなしに敵国を転覆させるのです。
he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.


[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no harm to individuals.  
The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed 
"Father and mother of the people."]


７．自軍は無傷のままに天下の覇権を争い、一兵も失うことなく完全な勝利を手に入れる。
7.  With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.


[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning:   
"And thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."]


これが計略をもって攻撃することの原則です。
This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

８．自軍が敵の十倍であれば、包囲しましょう。
8.  It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him;

五倍であれば、攻撃しなさい。
if five to one, to attack him;


[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.]


二倍であれば、自軍を二手に分けましょう。
if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.


[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; 
and at first sight, indeed, it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. 
Ts'ao Kung, however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu's meaning:   
"Being two to the enemy's one, we may use one part of our army in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion."  
Chang Yu thus further elucidates the point:  
"If our force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear; 
if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind;  
if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front."   
This is what is meant by saying that 
'one part may be used in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.'   
Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one's army is simply an irregular, just as concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too hasty in calling this a mistake."]


９．もし同数であるならば、戦いを挑んでも構いません。
9.  If equally matched, we can offer battle;


[Li Ch`uan,  followed by Ho Shih,  gives the following paraphrase:   
"If attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able general will fight."]


やや数が少ないのであれば、敵を回避しましょう。
if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;


[The meaning, "we can WATCH the enemy," is certainly a great improvement on the above; 
but unfortunately there appears to be no very good authority for the variant.  
Chang Yu reminds us that the saying only applies if the other factors are equal; 
a small difference in numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.]


もしどうやっても不利な場合は、身を隠すのです。
if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

１０．ゆえに、勝ち目のない戦いは弱い方の軍が起こしたものかもしれませんが、最後には強い方に捕らえられてしまうことになるのです。
10.  Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.

１１．さて、将軍は国の防壁です。
11.  Now the general is the bulwark of the State; 

もし防壁があらゆる点で完璧であれば、国は強いでしょう。
if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong;

もし防壁に欠陥があれば、国は弱くなります。
if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.


[As Li Ch`uan tersely puts it:  
"Gap indicates deficiency; 
if the general's ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his profession),  his army will lack strength."]


１２．国王が自軍に不幸をもたらすのには三つのやり方があります。
12.  There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:--

１３．（１）実際には無理であることも知らず、軍隊に進めだの退けだのと命令すること。
13.  (1)  By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey.

このようなことを軍の足を引っ張るというのです。
This is called hobbling the army.


[Li Ch`uan adds the comment:  
"It is like tying together the legs of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop."   
One would naturally think of "the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a distance.  
But the commentators understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of T`ai Kung:   
"A kingdom should not be governed from without, and army should not be directed from within."   
Of course it is true that, during an engagement, or when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart.
Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong orders.]


１４．（２）軍隊の現場のことを無視して、国を治めるのと同じやり方で軍隊も統率しようとすること。
14.  (2)  By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army.

これをすると兵士は投げやりになってしまいます。
This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds.


[Ts`ao Kung's note is, freely translated:   
"The military sphere and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; 
you can't handle an army in kid gloves."  
And Chang Yu says:   
"Humanity and justice are the principles on which to govern a state, but not an army;  
opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are military rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of an army"--to that of a State, understood.]


１５．（３）軍の現状に適した方針を無視して、自軍の将校を雇うのに分け隔てなく誰でも雇ってしまうこと。
15.  (3)   By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,
[That is,  he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.]
through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances.

これでは兵士の信頼が揺らいでしまいます。
This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.


[I follow Mei Yao-ch`en here.  
The other commentators refer not to the ruler, as in SS. 13, 14, but to the officers he employs.  
Thus Tu Yu says:  
"If a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted with a position of authority."  
Tu Mu quotes:  
"The skillful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and the stupid man.  
For the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has no fear of death."]


１６．軍がやけっぱちで不信感を持っている状態であれば、諸外国は必ずや攻め込んで来ることになります。
16.  But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. 

それではただ軍に無秩序をもたらすことになり、みすみす勝利を逃してしまいます。
This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.

１７．そういうわけで、わたしたちは勝利の五つの法則を知ったことになります。
17.  Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:

（１）いつ闘うべきで、いつ闘わないでいるべきかを知っている人は勝ちます。
(1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.


[Chang Yu says:  
If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive;  
if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive.  
He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive or the defensive.]


（２）優勢な軍隊と劣性な軍隊の両方の扱い方を知っている人は勝ちます。
(2)   He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.


[This is not merely the general's ability to estimate numbers correctly, as Li Ch`uan and others make out.  
Chang Yu expounds the saying more satisfactorily:  
"By applying the art of war, it is possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and vice versa.  
The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting the right moment slip.  
Thus Wu Tzu says:   
'With a superior force, make for easy ground; 
with an inferior one,  make for difficult ground.'"]


（３）どの階級の兵士も心を一つにして鼓舞されている軍隊を率いる人は勝ちます。
(3)  He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

（４）常に備えがあって、敵の備えが薄いときを狙う人は勝ちます。
(4)   He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.

（５）軍事の才能があって、国王が干渉してこない人は勝ちます。
(5)   He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.


[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying:  
"It is the sovereign's function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of the general."  
It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on the part of the home government.
Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by central authority.]


１８．というようなわけで、こんなことが言われるのです。
18.  Hence the saying:

「敵と自分自身のことを理解していれば、百回の戦闘にもその結果を心配する必要はありません。
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. 

自分ことは分かっているけれども敵のことは知らないという場合は、勝利を得る度に同じくらい負けて苦しみもするでしょう。
If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.


[Li Ch`uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch`in, who in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor.
When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh An and Huan Ch`ung, he boastfully replied:   
"I have the population of eight provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one million;  
why,  they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into the stream.  
What danger have I to fear?"
Nevertheless,  his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.]


もし敵のことも味方のことも理解していなければ、どの戦いでもボロ負けしてしまうでしょう」と。
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.


[Chang Yu said:  
"Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive."  
He adds:  
"Attack is the secret of defense;  
defense is the planning of an attack."  
It would be hard to find a better epitome of the root-principle of war.]

　
四・戦略的な作戦計画
IV.  TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS


[Ts`ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of this chapter:  
"marching and countermarching on the part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other's condition."   
Tu Mu says:  
"It is through the dispositions of an army that its condition may be discovered.  
Conceal your dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which leads to victory,;  
show your dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which leads to defeat."  
Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can "secure success by modifying his tactics to meet those of the enemy."]


１．孫子は言いました。
1.  Sun Tzu said:

「昔の優秀な戦士たちは、まず負けるはずのない態勢を作り上げてから、敵を倒せる機会を待ちました。
The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

２．負けない態勢を作ることはこちら側の問題です。敵を倒せる機会ができるかどうかは相手側の問題なのです。
2.  To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.


     [That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy's part.]


３．つまり、いい戦士たちは負けない態勢を作ることはできますが、
3.  Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,


[Chang Yu says this is done,  
"By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."]


敵を倒す機会を作ることはできないのです。
but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

４．ですから
「敵を倒すやり方を知っている人も、それができるわけではない」
と言われているのです。
4.  Hence the saying:  
One may KNOW how to conquer without being able to DO it.

５．負けない体勢というのは守備態勢のことです。
5.  Security against defeat implies defensive tactics;

敵を倒せる能力というのは攻撃に回るということです。
ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.


[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss.  1-3, in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me.
The meaning they give,  "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive," is plausible enough.]


６．守りに回るというのは、そんなに強くはないということを示します。
6.   Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength;

攻撃するということは、圧倒的に強いということです。
attacking, a superabundance of strength.

７．守りに長けた人は地中奥深くのいちばん隠れたところに身を隠します。
7.  The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth;


[Literally,  "hides under the ninth earth,"  which is a metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know his whereabouts."]


攻撃に長けた人は天の高見から急襲するのです。
he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.


[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. 
This is the opinion of most of the commentators.]


つまり一方で防御の能力を持っていれば、
Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves;

もう一方には完全な勝利があるのです。
on the other, a victory that is complete.

８．一般の人たちに理解できる程度のものであった場合にしか勝利と見なさないようであれば、最高に優れているとはいえません。
8.  To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.


[As Ts`ao Kung remarks, 
"the thing is to see the plant before it has germinated," 
to foresee the event before the action has begun.  
Li Ch`uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the vastly superior army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city of Ch`eng-an, said to his officers:  
"Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner."  
The officers hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent.  
But Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."]


９．闘って相手を征服し、国中が「よくやった！」と誉めてくれても、やはり最高に優れているとはいえません。
9.  Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight andconquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"


[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says:  
"To plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and balk his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood."  
Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things that "the world's coarse thumb And finger fail to plumb."]


１０．細くなった髪の毛を持ち上げても力持ちだということにはなりません。
10.  To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;


["Autumn" hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh.  
The phrase is a very common one in Chinese writers.]


太陽や月が見えたからといってことさら目がいいというわけではありません。
to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight;

雷鳴が聞こえたからといって耳がいいというわけではありません。
to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.


[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick hearing:  
Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone;  
Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a mustard seed; 
and Shih K`uang, a blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.]


１１．昔の人たちは優れた戦士のことを、ただ勝つだけでなく、いとも簡単に勝つところがすごいと言っていました。
11.  What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.


[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering."   
Mei Yao-ch`en says:  
"He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; 
he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease."]


１２．というのも、そんな人の勝利は知恵を讃えられたり、勇気を賞賛されたりはしないからです。
12.  Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.


[Tu Mu explains this very well:  
"Inasmuch as his victories are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world as large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; 
inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage."]


１３．そのような人はミスを犯さずに戦いに勝ちます。
13.  He wins his battles by making no mistakes.


[Ch`en Hao says:   
"He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile attacks."  
The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu:  
"One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished;
whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win."]


ミスを犯さなければ、勝利は確かなものになります。
Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory,

なぜなら敵を征服する前にもう勝ったことになっているからです。
for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

１４．というのも、優れた兵士は負けることがあり得ない立場に身を置き、敵を倒せる瞬間を見逃したりはしないからです。
14.  Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.


[A  "counsel of perfection"  as Tu Mu truly observes. 
"Position" need not be confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops.  
It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase the safety of his army.]


１５．そんなわけで、勝利する軍の作戦を立てる人は、すでに勝ってしまってから戦争を始めますが、負けると決まっているような人はまず始めに戦って、その後から勝利を求めるのです。
15.  Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.


[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox:  
"In warfare, first lay plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle;  
if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be assured."]


１６．立派なリーダーは徳の高い政治を敷き、秩序と規律を厳格に守ります。
16.  The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline;

だから勝利を収めるのも思うがままなのです。
thus it is in his power to control success.

１７．軍隊の運用についてわたしたちが見てきたのは、まず一番目には計ること、二番目には量を見積もること、三番目には計算すること、四番目にはチャンスをそれぞれ比べてみること、五番目には勝利することです。
17.  In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

１８．計るというのは、地面あってのことです。
18.  Measurement owes its existence to Earth; 

量を見積もるのは計ること、計算は数の見積もり、チャンスをそれぞれ比べてみることは計算、勝利はチャンスをそれぞれ比べてみることがあって成り立つのです。
Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.


[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the Chinese.  
The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy's strength, and to make calculations based on the data thus obtained; 
we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy's chances with our own; 
if the latter turn the scale, then victory ensues.  
The chief difficulty lies in third term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a calculation of NUMBERS, thereby making it nearly synonymous with the second term.  
Perhaps the second term should be thought of as a consideration of the enemy's general position or condition, while the third term is the estimate of his numerical strength.
On the other hand, Tu Mu says:   
"The question of relative strength having been settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play."  
Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, but weakens it.  
However, it points to the third term as being a calculation of numbers.]


１９．行軍してくる敵軍に向かい合った勝利する軍隊は、一粒の種と一緒に計りに乗せられた１ポンドの錘のようなものです。
19.  A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.


[Literally, "a victorious army is like an I (20 oz.) weighed against a SHU (1/24 oz.); 
a routed army is a SHU weighed against an I."   
The point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one demoralized by defeat."  
Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix.  2, makes the I to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi's statement that it equaled 20 oz. only.  
But Li Ch`uan of the T`ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.]


２０．相手を征服しようとする軍の突撃は、せき止められた水が決壊して六百フィートの谷になだれ込むのと似ています。
20.  The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.
　

五・勢い 
V.  ENERGY

１．孫子は言いました。
1.  Sun Tzu said:

「大軍を率いるのは、その原理は少人数を率いるのと同じです。
The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men:

ただその人数分けが問題になるだけなのです。 
it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.


[That is,  cutting up the army into regiments,  companies, etc.,  with subordinate officers in command of each.  
Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin's famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him:  
"How large an army do you think I could lead?"   
"Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty."   
"And you?"
asked the Emperor.  
"Oh!" 
he answered, 
"the more the better."]


２．軍を率いて人数の多い敵と戦うのは、少人数の敵と戦うのとほとんど違いはありません。
2.  Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: 

号令や合図が問題になるだけです。 
it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.

３．自軍が敵軍の猛攻に必ず耐えて、揺るがないでいられるようにすること。
3.  To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken

これは正攻法と奇襲の作戦行動によってできることです。 
- this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.


[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzu's treatise, the discussion of the CHENG and the CH`I."  
As it is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to render them consistently by good English equivalents;  
it may be as well to tabulate some of the commentators' remarks on the subject before proceeding further.
Li Ch`uan:  
"Facing the enemy is CHENG, making lateral diversion is CH`I.  
Chia Lin:  
"In presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal maneuvers must be employed."   
Mei Yao-ch`en:
"CH`I is active, CHENG is passive; 
passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity beings the victory itself."  
Ho Shih:   
"We must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; 
thus CHENG may also be CH`I, and CH`I may also be CHENG."  
He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against Lin-chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent. [Ch`ien Han Shu, ch. 3.]  Here, we are told, the march on Lin-chin was CHENG, and the surprise maneuver was CH`I."
Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words:
"Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of CH`I and CHENG.  
Wei Liao Tzu [4th cent. B.C.] says:  
'Direct warfare favors frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.' 
Ts`ao Kung says:  
'Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation;   
appearing on the enemy's rear is an indirect maneuver.'  
Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says:  
'In war, to march straight ahead is CHENG; 
turning movements, on the other hand, are CH`I.'  
These writers simply regard CHENG as CHENG, and CH`I as CH`I;  
they do not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a circle [see infra, ss. 11].  
A comment on the T`ang Emperor T`ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter:  
'A CH`I maneuver may be CHENG, if we make the enemy look upon it as CHENG; 
then our real attack will be CH`I, and vice versa.  
The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.'"
To put it perhaps a little more clearly:  
any attack or other operation is CHENG, on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; whereas that is CH`I," 
which takes him by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter.  
If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be CH`I,"  it immediately becomes CHENG."]


４．自軍の攻撃が卵に投げつけられた石のようであるのは、これは弱点と強みを研究したからこそなのです。 
4.  That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg - this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.

５．どんな戦いでも、戦端を開くのには正攻法がとられるでしょう。
5.  In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle,

しかし奇襲作戦は勝利を確実にするために必要とされるはずです。 
but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.


[Chang Yu says:  
"Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the enemy's flanks or falling on his rear."   
A brilliant example of "indirect tactics"  which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts' night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. [1]


６．奇襲作戦を効果的に用いれば、さながら天と地のように疲れを知らず、また川が溢れたり流れるように無尽蔵に、
6.  Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; 

太陽と月のように沈んでもまた新たに昇り、
like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; 

四季の移り変わりのように去ってもまた舞い戻って来るようになるのです。
like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more. 


[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of CH`I and CHENG."  
But at present Sun Tzu is not speaking of CHENG at all,  unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating to it has fallen out of the text.  
Of course,  as has already been pointed out, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot really be considered apart.  
Here we simply have an expression, in figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.]


７．五つの音しかなくても、その五つが組合わされば聞いたこともないようなメロディーを奏でることにもなります。 
7.  There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.

８．五つの原色（青、黄色、赤、白、黒）しかなくても、組み合わせれば見たこともないような色合いになります。 
8.  There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.

９．主な味覚は五つ（酸っぱさ、辛さ、塩辛さ、甘さ、苦さ）しかなくても、組み合わせればこれまでにない味わいを生み出すようになります。 
9   There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.

１０．戦闘中には二つの攻撃方法しかありません。
10.  In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack 

正攻法と奇襲です。
-  the direct and the indirect;

それでもこの二つを組み合わせれば無限の作戦ができるのです。
yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.

　
つづく 


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00/09/29 第二章追加
00/10/22 第三章追加　細かいところを訂正
00/10/23 第四章追加　素早い更新に我ながら感心。
01/09/02 遅ればせながら第五章追加。一年近くも放っておいたのか・・・
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