レヴィ･ストロース 野生の思考 (1976) 

2018.8.19

　フランスの人類学者 レヴィ･ストロースは、La Pensée sauvage  (パンセ･ソバージュ) を、1962年に発表しました。

フランス語の pensée は、思考 の意味だけでなく、三色スミレのパンジー も意味しますので、

英訳すると、savage mind もしくは、savage pansy となります。

savage は、野蛮な、未開な という意味でしばしば用いられますが、

savage pansy ならば、野蛮なパンジーではなく、野生のパンジー という意味になります。

　みすず書房から、1976年に、翻訳がでました。未開の思考 ではなく、野生の思考 と訳されています。

　巻末の 訳者あとがき に、この本の出版の意味合いが、上手に説明されていますので、引用します。

　『野生の思考』は、1960年代に始まったいわゆる構造主義ブームの発火点となり、フランスにおける戦後思想史最大の転換をひき起こした著作である。

本書の直接の主題は、文明人の思考と本質的に異なる「未開の思考」なるものが存在するという幻想の解体である。

未開性の特徴と考えられてきた呪術的・神話的思考、具体の論理は、実は「野蛮人の思考」ではなく、

われわれ「文明人」の日常の知的操作や芸術活動にも重要な役割を果たしており、むしろ「野生の思考」と呼ぶべきものである。

それに対して「科学的思考」は、かぎられた目的に即して効率を上げるために作り出された「栽培思考」なのだ。

この分析を通じてレヴィ･ストロースは野生の思考を復権させるとともに、神話の論理の探求への道を開いた。

それは人間精神の普遍性の把握にもとづく異文化理解の基礎理論の建設であると同時に、

「野蛮人とは野蛮を信ずる者のことだ」とまで言い切るほどに厳しい、西欧文化のエスノセントリズムの自己批判でもある。

　山竹伸二さんのホームページに、「野生の思考」の 第一章 具体の科学、第二章 トーテム的分類の論理、

第八章 再び見出された時、第九章 歴史と弁証法 についての詳しい解説がありますので、

まずは、それを読まれることをおすすめします。　　http://yamatake.chu.jp/03phi/1phi_a/4.html

　第９章 歴史と弁証法 は、サルトルの 弁証法的理性批判 に対する反論の形で書かれています。

サルトルの用語に従うと、分析的理性は、歴史を客観的事実として外から眺めるのに対し、

弁証法的理性は、実践的に歴史の中に参入することによって歴史の意味を了解しようとします。

しかし、歴史を研究する態度において、サルトルと、レヴィ･ストロースは、激しく対立します。

　Prefaceで、レヴィ･ストロースは、語ります。

●If I have felt obliged to give expression to my disagreement with Sartre regarding the points which bear on the philosophical fundaments of anthropology, I have only determined to do so after several readings of the work in question which occupied my pupils at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes and myself during many sessions of the year 1960-1.
　私が、感じたとしても｜サルトルとの意見の不一致を表明しなければならないと｜人類学(人間学)の哲学的基礎に係るいくつかの点について｜、そう感じたのは、問題の本に関する何回かの読書会の後でした。その読書会は、高等教育院の私の生徒と私自身の、1960-1の多数の学期の間の時間を塞ぎました。

Over and above our inevitable divergences I hope that Sartre will recognize above all that a discussion to which so much care has been given constitutes on behalf of all of us a homage of admiration and respect.
私達の不可避な相違を超えて、私は望みます、サルトルが認めてくれることを｜かなりの注意を払ってなされたこの議論が、私達全員を代表して、称賛と尊敬の敬意をあらわすと｜。

　第９章の内容に興味があるので、読もうとしていますが、文章が難しく、なかなか理解できません。

フランス語の原文で読むことはできないので、英語訳を日本語に翻訳しながら、内容を読み解くことにしました。

　インターネットの中をサーフィンしていて、蕃神義雄さんのブログに関連記事をみつけました。

　レヴィストロースによるサルトル批判 １　　　　2018.03.05

　レヴィストロースによるサルトル批判 ２　　　　2018.03.08

　レヴィストロースによるサルトル批判 ３　　　　2018.03.11

　レヴィストロースによるサルトル批判 ４　　　　2018.03.13

　レヴィストロースによるサルトル批判 ５　　　　2018.03.15

　レヴィストロースによるサルトル批判 ６　　　　2018.03.17

　レヴィストロースによるサルトル批判 ７　　　　2018.03.19

　レヴィストロースによるサルトル批判 ８　　　　2018.03.21

　レヴィストロースによるサルトル批判 ９　　　　2018.03.23

　レヴィストロースによるサルトル批判 10　　　　2018.03.28

　レヴィストロースによるサルトル批判 11　　　　2018.04.04

　フランス語のテキストと、その翻訳も載っていますので、役に立ちます。

Levi-Strauss  The Savage Mind　　　　　　野生の思考

Chapter 9　HISTORY AND DIALECTIC　　歴史と弁証法

●In the course of this work I have allowed myself, not without ulterior motive, to borrow a certain amount of Sartre's vocabulary.
この本の執筆過程において、私は、下心なしではなく(下心をもって)、サルトルの用語のいくつかを借用することを自らに許しました。

I wanted to lead the reader to face a problem, the discussion of which will serve to introduce my conclusion.
私は、読者を導きたかったのです｜ある一つの問題に直面するように｜、その問題を議論することは、この本の結論への導入の役を果たすのです。

The problem is to what extent thought that can and will be both anecdotal and geometrical may yet be called dialectical.
その問題とは、思考が、逸話的でありかつ幾何学的であり得て、また、普通はそうでありながらも、それでも、弁証法的であると呼ばれることができるのは、どの程度までかということです。

The savage mind totalizes.　　野生の思考は、全体化します(全体化作用をもちます)。

説明　野生の思考は、無秩序に直面したとき、その状況をあるがままに全体的に把握し、

　　　全体把握に基いて物事を主観的に分類し、実際的に生活圏に取り込んでしまいます。

It claims indeed to go very much further in this direction than Sartre allows dialectical reason,
野生の思考は、この方向に更にずっと進むことを要求します、サルトルが弁証法的理性に許したよりももっとずっと。

for, on the one hand, the latter lets pure seriality escape (and we have just seen how classificatory systems succeed in incorporating it)
というのは、一方で、弁証法的理性は、単純集列性を取り逃がしてしまいます (そして、分類システムがこの単純集列性をいかに上手に取り込むことに成功するかを今見たところです。)

説明　集列性(seriality) は、サルトルの用語で、バスを待つ人でできるような列を集列体(series)と呼び、

　　　一定の目的をもって集まる集団(group)と対比させて、組織されなくとも列や集まりはできることを指していると思います。

and, on the other, it excludes schematization, in which these same systems reach their consummation.
そして、他方では、弁証法的理性は、図式性を排除しますが、図式性において、これらの分類システムは、それぞれの完成に達します。

In my view, it is in this intransigent refusal on the part of the savage mind to allow anything human (or even living) to remain alien to it, that the real principle of dialectical reason is to be found.
私の考えでは、野生の思考は、すべて人間的なもの(すべて生きているもの)が、野生の思考に無関係でいることを断固として許さないことの中にこそ、弁証法的理性の真の原理を見出すことができるのです。

But my idea of the latter is very different from Sartre's.
しかし、弁証法的理性についての私の考えは、サルトルの考えとは非常に異なっています。

●In reading the Critique it is difficult to avoid feeling that Sartre vacillates between two conceptions of dialectical reason.
　サルトルの「弁証法的理性批判」を読むと、サルトルが、弁証法的理性の二つの概念の間を揺れ動いていると感じざるをえません。

Sometimes he opposes dialectical and analytical reason as truth and error, if not as God and the devil,
時に、彼は、弁証法的理性と分析的理性を、真理と誤謬として対比します、神と悪魔として対比するまではしないとしても、

説明　悪魔と神は、サルトルの戯曲で、実存主義哲学の立場から、善と悪について探求しています。

while at other times these two kinds of reason are apparently complementary, different routes to the same truths.
しかし、別の時には、この二つの種類の理性は、明らかに、同じ真理に向かう相補的な二つの道なのです。

The first conception not only discredits scientific knowledge and finally even leads to suggesting the impossibility of a science of biology, it also involves a curious paradox ;
第一の考え方は、科学的知識の信用を落とし、生物の科学が不可能であることを示唆するにいたるだけでなく、奇妙な逆説を包含しています。

for the work entitled Critique de la raison dialectique is the result of the author's exercise of his own analytical reason :
というのは、「弁証法的理性批判」と名付けられた著作は、自らの分析的理性を自らが行使した結果なのですから；

he defines, distinguishes, classifies and opposes.
彼が、定義し、弁別し、分類し、対比させたのです。

This philosophical treatise is no different in kind from the works it examines and with which it engages in discussion, if only to condemn them.
「弁証法的理性批判」は、それが、精査し、ただ論駁するためだけにせよ、議論をしようとしている他の著作と、異なる性質をもつものではありません。

It is difficult to see how analytical reason could be applied to dialectical reason and claim to establish it, if the two are defined by mutually exclusive characteristics.
分かりかねます、どうして、分析的理性を弁証法的理性に適用して、それを立証したりできるのでしょうか、もし、二者が、互いに排他的な特徴を持つと定義されているとして。

The second conception is open to a different objection :
第二の考え方は、別の反論にさらされます。

if dialectical and analytical reason ultimately arrive at the same results, and if their respective truths merge into a single truth, then, one may ask in what way they are opposed and, in particular, on what grounds the former should be pronounced superior to the latter.
弁証法的理性と分析的理性が最終的には同じ結果に至り、それぞれの真理は、一つの真理に融合するならば、人は尋ねるでしょう、どうして二つは対比されるのか、特に、どんな根拠で、前者は後者より優れているというのかと。

Sartre's endeavour seems contradictory in the one case and superfluous in the other.
サルトルの試みは、第一のケースでは矛盾していて、第二のケースでは余計なものです。

●How is the paradox to be explained, and avoided?
　このパラドクスは、いかに説明され、いかに避けられるのでしょうか？

Sartre attributes a reality sui generis to dialectical reason in both the hypotheses between which he hesitates.
サルトルは、弁証法的理性に独自の実在性を与えています、彼が迷っている二つの仮説の両方において。

It exists independently of analytical reason, as its antagonist or alternatively its complement.
弁証法的理性は、分析的理性とは独立して存在します、その敵対者として、もしくは、その補間者として。

Although in both our cases Marx is the point of departure of our thought, it seems to me that the Marxist orientation leads to a different view, namely, that the opposition between the two sorts of reason is relative not absolute.
この二つのケースのどちらもマルクスがその出発点なのですが、マルクス主義的考え方は、サルトルとは異なる見方に至るように私には思えます、すなわち、二つの理性の対立は、相対的であって、絶対的ではないという見方に。

It corresponds to a tension within human thought which may persist indefinitely de facto, but which.has no basis de jure.
この対立は、人の思考の中の緊張に対応します、この緊張は事実上は無限に存続するかもしれませんが、正当な根拠はもちません。

In my view dialectical reason is always constitutive:
私の考えでは、弁証法的理性は、つねに、構成する理性です。

説明　Lalande の用語で、構成する理性＝関係の知覚によって普遍的必然的原理を形成する万人共通の能力、

　　　構成された理性＝現に我々の推論の基礎になっている原理、規範

　　　サルトルが、「弁証法的理性は、構成する理性でもなければ、構成された理性でもない。

　　　それは、世界のなかで、また世界によって己を構成してゆく理性、しかも己の中に

　　　すべての構成された諸理性を解消することによってまた新しい諸理性を構成し、やがて今度は

　　　その新しい諸理性をも乗り越え解消してゆく − そうした理性なのである。」と言ったことに対して

　　　レヴィ･ストロースは、弁証法的理性は、つねに、構成する理性 だと主張します。

It is the bridge, forever extended and improved, which analytical reason throws out over an abyss ;
弁証法的理性は、永遠に延長され改良される橋で、分析的理性が深淵の上に投げかけた橋です。

it is unable to see the further shore but it knows that it is there, even should it be constantly receding.
弁証法的理性は、対岸を見る事ができません、対岸があることは知っていますが、対岸は常に遠ざかりすらするのかもしれませんが。

The term dialectical reason thus covers the perpetual efforts analytical reason must make to reform itself if it aspires to account for language, society and thought ;
弁証法的理性という用語は、従って、カバーしています、分析的理性が、自らを改革するためになさねばならない永遠の努力を、分析的理性が言語、社会、思想を解明しようと目指すときに。

and the distinction between the two forms of reason in my view rests only on the temporary gap separating analytical reason from the understanding of life.
そして、理性の二つの形の間の区別は、私の考えでは、分析的理性が生命の理解から切り離されている一時的なギャップにのみ依拠している。

Sartre calls analytical reason reason in repose ;
サルトルは、分析的理性を休息中の理性と呼びます；

I call the same reason dialectical when it is roused to action, tensed by its efforts to transcend itself.
私は、その同じ分析的理性を弁証法的であると呼びます、それが、自らを超越しようとする努力によって緊張し、何か活動をしようと目覚めたとき。

●In Sartre's terminology I am therefore to be defined as a transcendental materialist and aesthete.
　サルトルの用語においては、従って、私は、超越論的唯物論者や審美主義者であると定義されます。

I am a transcendental materiarist (p.124) because I do not regard dialectical reason as something other than analytical reason, upon which the absolute originality of a human order would be based, but as something additional in analytical reason :
私は、超越論的唯物論者です、何故なら、私は、弁証法的理性を分析的理性以外のなにかであるとはみなさないからです。人間の秩序の絶対的なオリジナリティである弁証法的理性は、この分析的理性に依拠しているが、分析的理性における何か付加的なものとしてである。

the necessary condition for it to venture to undertake the resolution of the human into the non-human.
分析的理性が、人間的なものを非人間的なものに解消することをあえて引き受けるための必要条件です。

And I count as an aesthete since Sartre applies this term to anyone purporting to study men as if they were ants (p. 183).
私が、自分を審美主義者とみなすのは、サルトルが、人間を蟻であるかのように研究すると主張する人に、この用語を適用しているからです。

But apart from the fact that this seems to me just the attitude of any scientist who is an agnostic, there is nothing very compromising about it,
しかし、このことは、私には、不可知論者であるどんな科学者でも示す態度であるようにみえるという事実は別にして、それについて妥協すべきことは何もない。

for ants with their artificial tunnels, their social life and their chemical messages, already present a sufficiently tough resistance to the enterprises of analytical reason . . .
何故なら、蟻は、巣穴を掘り、社会生活を営み、化学物質でメッセージを交わしていて、すでに、分析的理性の企てに対し、十分頑強な抵抗を示しています。

So I accept the characterization of aesthete in so far as I believe the ultimate goal of the human sciences to be not to constitute, but to dissolve man.
そこで、私は、審美主義者として特徴つけられることを受け入れます、私が、人間科学の究極目的は、人間を構成することではなく、分解することであると信じる限りにおいて。

The pre-eminent value of anthropology is that it represents the first step in a procedure which involves others.
人類学の卓越した価値は、それが、いくつかのステップを含む手続きの最初のステップを表すことです。

Ethnographic analysis tries to arrive at invariants beyond the empirical diversity of human societies ;
民族誌の分析は、人間社会の多様性の経験を越えて不変のものに到達しようとの試みです。

and, as the present work shows, these are sometimes to be found at the most unforeseen points.
そして、この本の研究が示すように、これらは、時に、最も予期されない点で見つかったりします。

Rousseau ( 2, ch. VIII) foresaw this with his usual acumen :
ルソーは、このことを彼のいつもの慧眼で予見しました。

'One needs to look near at hand if one wants to study men ; but to study man one must learn to look from afar ;
「人は人間達を研究したいなら近寄って見ることが必要、しかし、人間(単数形)を学ぶときは遠くからながめなければならない。

one must first observe differences in order to discover attributes'.
人は、物事の特性を発見するためには、まず、違いを観察することが必要です。」

However, it would not be enough to reabsorb particular humanities into a general one.
しかし、個別の人間性(複数)を一つの一般的人間性に再吸収するだけでは、十分でない。

This first enterprise opens the way for others which Rousseau would not have been so ready to accept and which are incumbent on the exact natural sciences :
この最初の企ては、他の人達に道を開くものですが、その道を、ルソーは喜んでは受け入れなかったでしょうし、その道は、厳密な自然科学に課せられたものです。

the reintegration of culture in nature and finally of life within the whole of its physico-chemical conditions.*
厳密な自然科学、すなわち、文化を自然のなかに再統合し、最終的には、生命を、物理化学的条件の全体像の中に再統合すること。

* The opposition between nature and culture to which I attached much importance at one time (1, ch. 1 and 2) now seems to be of primarily methodological importance.
注：自然と文化の対立に、かつて私は(親族の基本構造、第1,2章) かなりの重要性を与えたが、今は、主として、方法論的に重要なのだと思っている。

●However, in spite of the intentionally brutal turn given to my thesis, I am not blind to the fact that the verb 'dissolve' does not in any way imply (but even excludes) the destruction of the constituents of the body subjected to the action of another body.
　しかし、私の論文に向けられた意図的に乱暴な言い回しにもかかわらず、私は、盲目ではありません(気付いています)、動詞 溶解する(dissolve)は、決して、別の体の作用にさらされて体の成分が破壊することを、意味していない(むしろ排除している)ことに。

The solution of a solid into a liquid alters the disposition of its molecules.
固体が液体に溶解することは、分子の配列を変化させます。

It also often provides an efficacious method of putting them by so that they can be recovered in case of need and their properties be better studied.
溶解は、分子を備蓄する有効な方法を与えるので、分子は必要なときに取り戻すことができ、分子の属性をよりよく研究することができます。

The reductions I am envisaging are thus legitimate, or indeed possible, only if two conditions are satisfied.
私が思っている還元作用は、合法的であるか、実際可能となります、二つの条件が満たされる限りにおいて。

First, the phenomena subjected to reduction must not be impoverished ;
最初に、還元を受ける諸現象は、貧困化されてはいけない。

one must be certain that everything contributing to their distinctive richness and originality has been collected around them.
分子の独特の豊かさやオリジナリティに貢献するすべてのものを、分子の周りに集めておくことを確認しなければいけません。

For it is pointless to pick up a hammer unless to hit the nail on the head.
何故なら、釘の頭を打つことなしに、金づちを手にすることは、無意味だからです。

●Secondly, one must be ready to accept, as a consequence of each reduction, the total overturning of any preconceived idea concerning the level, whichever it may be, one is striving to attain.
　第二に、人は、受け入れる用意がなければならない、各還元作用の結果として、到達しようとしているレベル(それがいかなるレベルであろうとも)に関する任意の既成概念が完全に引っくり返されることを。

The idea of some general humanity to which ethnographic reduction leads, will bear no relation to any one may have formed in advance.
民族誌的還元が導くある一般的な人間性の観念は、人が前もって形成していたどんな観念とも、関係をもちません。

And when we do finally succeed in understanding life as a function of inert matter, it will be to discover that the latter has properties very different from those previously attributed to it.
そして、私達が、最終的に、不活性な物質の機能として生命を理解することに成功するとき、それは、不活性物質が、これまでその属性と考えてきた特性とは全く異なる特性をもっていることを発見することになるでしょう。

Levels of reduction cannot therefore be classed as superior and inferior,
それ故、還元のレベルを優と劣に分類することも出来ません、

for the level taken as superior must, through the reduction, be expected to communicate retroactively some of its richness to the inferior level to which it will have been assimilated.
というのは、優とみなされていたレベルが、還元をとおして、その豊かさのいくらかを、それが同化吸収された劣のレベルに、遡及的に伝達されることが予想されるからです。

Scientific explanation consists not in moving from the complex to the simple but in the replacement of a less intelligible complexity by one which is more so.
科学的な説明は、複雑から単純に移行することにあるのではなく、理解しにくい複雑性を理解しやすい複雑性に置き換えることにあるのです。

●Seen in this light, therefore, my self is no more opposed to others than man is opposed to the world :
　それ故、この明かりのもとに眺めると、私の自己は他者に対立しません、人間が世界に対立しないのと同じく。

the truths learnt through man are 'of the world', and they are important for this reason.*
人間を通して学ばれた真理は、「世界のもの」であり、この故にこそ、重要なのです。

*This even holds for mathematical truths of which a contemporary logician, however, says that 'The characteristic of mathematical thought is that it does not convey truth about the external world' (Heyting, pp. 8-9).
注：これは数学的真理についても成り立ちます、しかし、それについて或る現代の論理学者は言います。「数学の特徴は、それが、数学の外の世界の真理はもたらさないのだ。」と。

*But mathematical thought at any rate reflects the free functioning of the mind, that is, the activity of the cells of the cerebral cortex, relatively emancipated from. any external constraint and obeying only its own laws.
注：しかし、数学は、兎に角、反映します、精神の自由な作用を、すなわち、外部からの拘束から解放され、自らの法則にのみ従う大脳皮質細胞の活動を。

*As the mind too is a thing, the functioning of this thing teaches us something about the nature of things:
注：精神もものなので、このものの働きは、ものごとの性質について何かを教えてくれます。

*even pure reflection is in the last analysis an internalization of the cosmos.
注：純粋な思索ですら、最終的な解析においては、宇宙の内面化なのです。

*It illustrates the structure of what lies outside in a symbolic form : 'Logic and logistics are empirical sciences belonging to ethnography rather than psychology' (Beth, p. 151).
注：それは、説明します、外にあるものの構造を、象徴的な形で、「論理学とロジスティックスは、経験科学で、心理学よりも民族誌学に属します。」

This explains why I regard anthropology as the principle of all research,
このことは、私が何故人類学(民族学)を、すべての研究の基礎原理とみなすのかを説明します、

while for Sartre it raises a problem in the shape of a constraint to overcome or a resistance to reduce.
一方、サルトルにとって、それは、克服すべき障害、粉砕すべき抵抗の形で問題を提起するのです。

And indeed what can one make of peoples 'without history' when one has defined man in terms of dialectic and dialectic in terms of history?
それに実際、「歴史のない」人達をどうすればいいのでしょうか、震源を弁証法で定義し、弁証法を歴史で定義したというのに。

Sometimes Sartre seems tempted to distinguish two dialectics :
時に、サルトルは、二つの弁証法を区別しようとしているように見えます。

the 'true' one which is supposed to be that of historical societies, and a repetitive, short-term dialectic, which he grants so-called primitive societies whilst at the same time placing it very near biology.
「真の」弁証法｜それは歴史のある社会の弁証法です｜、と、反復的な短期間弁証法｜それは彼がいわゆる原始社会にも認めながらも、同時にそれを生物学に非常に近いものとしています｜、とです。

This imperils his whole system, 　　これは、彼のすべての体系を危険にさらします、

for the bridge between man and nature which he has taken such pains to destroy would turn out to be surreptitiously re-established through ethnography, which is indisputably a human science and devotes itself to the study of these societies.
というのは、彼が大層苦労して破壊した人間と自然の間の橋が、民族誌学を通して密かに再建されることになるからです、民族誌学は、議論の余地なく人文科学であり、原始社会の研究を目的とするものなのです。

Alternatively Sartre resigns himself to putting a 'stunted and deformed' humanity on man's side (p. 203),
別の方法として、サルトルは、一歩引いて、「発育不全で奇形な」人類を人間の側に認めます。

but not without implying that its place in humanity does not belong to it in its own right and is a function only of its adoption by historical humanity :
しかし、におわせることが無くも無くで｜人類におけるその位置は、その正当な位置に属するものでなく、歴史ある人類にどう採択されるかのみに関係していることを｜。

either because it has begun to internalize the latter's history in the colonial context,
理由は、それが、植民地の文脈において後者の歴史を内面化し始めたのか、

or because thanks to anthropology itself, historical humanity has given the blessing of meaning to an original humanity which was without it.
もしくは、人類学(民族学)自身のおかげで、歴史ある人類が、意味の祝福を、意味をもっていない原始の人類に与えたからかです。

Either way the prodigious wealth and diversity of habits, beliefs and customs is allowed to escape ;
どちらにしても、風俗、信仰、慣習の驚くべき豊かさや多様性は、取り逃がしている；

and it is forgotten that each of the tens or hundreds of thousands of societies which have existed side by side in the world or succeeded one another since man's first appearance, has claimed that it contains the essence of all the meaning and dignity of which human society is capable and, reduced though it may have been to a small nomad band or a hamlet lost in the depths of the forest, its claim has in its own eyes rested on a moral certainty comparable to that which we can invoke in our own case.
そして、忘れられているのは、何万、何十万の社会(世界中に共存し、もしくは、人類の最初の登場以来引き続いてきた) のそれぞれが、人間社会に可能な意味と尊厳のすべてのエッセンスを保持していると主張し、奥深い森に隠れた遊牧民の小さな一団や集落に縮小してしまったにもかかわらず、その主張が、彼らの目には、確実なモラル(現代の私達が私達の場合に喚起できるものに匹敵する)に基礎を置いていることです。

But whether in their case or our own, a good deal of egocentricity and naivety is necessary to believe that man has taken refuge in a single one of the historical or geographical modes of his existence,
しかし彼らの場合にしろ、私達の場合にしろ、大量の自己中心主義と素朴さが必要です｜人が彼の歴史的または地理的な存在様式の一つに逃避したのだと信じるには｜。

when the truth about man resides in the system of their differences and common properties.
人間の真理は、これらの様式の違いや、共通の特性の全体系のなかに存在するというのに。

●He who begins by steeping himself in the allegedly self-evident truths of introspection never emerges from them.
　内省による自明といわれている真理のなかに自分を浸すことから始める人は、その真理から決して出ることはない。

Knowledge of men sometimes seems easier to those who allow themselves to be caught up in the snare of personal identity.
人間の知識は、時に、自己のアイデンティティという罠に捕らわれることを許す人達には、より容易にみえるようです。

But they thus shut the door on knowledge of man : written or unavowed 'confessions' form the basis of all ethnographic research.
しかし、彼らは、人の知識に扉を閉ざすことになります、文章化されたり、公言はされていない「懺悔」は、民族誌学的研究の根本を形成します。

Sartre in fact becomes the prisoner of his Cogito :
サルトルは、実際、自分のコギトの虜となっています：

説明　コギトは、デカルトの有名な言葉 コギト・エルゴ・スム(我思う、故に我あり)の最初の言葉で、ラテン語です。

Descartes made it possible to attain universality, but conditionally on remaining psychological and individual ;
デカルトは、普遍性を獲得することを可能にしましたが、それは、心理学的、個人的に留まるという条件付きです。

by sociologizing the Cogito, Sartre merely exchanges one prison for another.
コギトを社会学的に考察することにより、サルトルは、ある監獄を別の監獄に変えたにすぎません。

Each subject's group and period now take the place of timeless consciousness.
各主体のグループや時代が、今は、無時間的意識の位置を占めている。

Moreover, Sartre's view of the world and man has the narrowness which has been traditionally credited to closed societies.
さらに、世界や人類に関するサルトルの考えは、偏狭で、それは、伝統的に、閉鎖社会に認められてきたものです。

His insistence on tracing a distinction between the primitive and the civilized with the aid of gratuitous contrasts reflects, in a scarcely more subtle form, the fundamental opposition he postulates between myself and others.
サルトルが、いわれのない対比の助けをかりて原始人と文明人の間の区別を追跡することを主張することは、殆ど同じ微妙な形で、サルトルが自身と他者の間に仮定する基本的対立を反映しています。

Yet there is little difference between the way in which this opposition is formulated in Sartre's work and the way it would have been formulated by a Melanesian savage, while the analysis of the practico-inert quite simply revives the language of animism.*
しかし、殆ど違いはありません、サルトルの著作でこの対立が策定されたやり方と、メラネシアの未開人によってそれが策定されたやり方の間には、一方で、この実践-不活性の分析は、単に、アニミズムの言語を復活させます。

説明　practico-inert は、サルトルの用語で、「人間の実践に源を持つ物質性、あるいは物質化され惰性化された実践の意」(竹内)

　　　Wictionary英語版では、Having arisen as the result of a sociopolitical struggle, but no longer responsive to the need it was intended to serve

　　　社会政治的な闘争の結果生じたが、もはやそれが働くように意図された必要に対して反応しない

　　　通常、実践的惰性態 と訳されているようですが、私は、実践-不活性 と訳します

*It is precisely because all these aspects of the savage mind can be discovered in Sartre's philosophy, that the latter is in my view unqualified to pass judgment on it:
注：それは、正に、野生の思考のこれらすべての特徴がサルトルの哲学の中にも見つけることが出来て、サルトルの哲学は、私の考えでは、そのことを判断するには不適格であると思うからです：

 he is prevented from doing so by the very fact of furnishing its equivalent.
 サルトルは、それとの等価性を備えているという正にその事実により、そうすることはできません

*To the anthropologist, on the contrary, this philosophy (like all the others) affords a first-class ethnographic document, the study of which is essential to an understanding of the mythology of our own time.
注：逆に、民族学者にとっては、サルトルの哲学は、(他のすべてと同様に) 第一級の民族誌学文献です、それを研究することは、現代の神話の理解に不可欠です。

説明　現代の神話とは、硬直したイデオロギーのドグマのこと

●Descartes, who wanted to found a physics, separated Man from Society.
　デカルトは、物理学(自然学)を構築しようと欲し、人間を社会から切り離しました。

Sartre, who claims to found an anthropology, separates his own society from others.
サルトルは、人間学(民族学)を構築しようとして、自分の社会を他の社会から切り離します。

A Cogito - which strives to be ingenuous and raw - retreats into individualism and empiricism and is lost in the blind alleys of social psychology.
或る一つのコギトは、純真でなまになろうと努め、個人主義や経験主義に引き籠り、社会心理学の暗い細道に迷い込む。

For it is striking that the situations which Sartre uses as a starting point for extracting the formal conditions of social reality - strikes, boxing matches, football matches, bus-stop queues - are all secondary incidentals of life in society ;
というのは、サルトルが、社会の現実の形式的な状態を抽出するための出発点として用いている状況、例えば、ストライキ、ボクシングの試合、フットボールの試合、バス停の行列、などは、すべて、社会での生活の二次的な出来事だということは、驚くべき事だからです。

and they cannot therefore serve to disclose its foundations.
そして、それらは、社会生活の基礎を解明するのに役立たない。

●This axiomatic, so far removed from the anthropologist's, is all the more disappointing when he feels himself very close to Sartre whenever the latter applies himself, with incomparable artistry, to grasping, in its dialectical movement, a present or past social experience within our own culture.
　この公理は、民族学者の公理とは全くかけ離れていますが、なおさらに失望します｜民族学者はサルトルに近いと感じているだけに｜サルトルが、無比の芸術性で、私達の文化の中の現在や過去の社会的経験を弁証法の動きの中で捕えることに献身しているとき｜。

Sartre then does what every anthropologist tries to do in the case of different cultures : to put himself in the place of the men living there, to understand the principle and pattern of their intentions, and to perceive a period or a culture as a significant set.
そして、サルトルは、民族学者の皆が異なる文化の場合にやろうとしていることをやります、自らを、そこに住んでいる人たちの場所に置き、彼らの原理や意図を理解し、意味あるセットとして時代や文化を感じるということを。

In this respect we can often learn from him, but these are lessons of a practical, not a theoretical, nature.
この点で私達はサルトルから学ぶことができます、しかし、それは理論的な性質ではなく、実際的な性質のレッスンです。

It is possible that the requirement of 'totalization' is a great novelty to some historians, sociologists and psychologists.
ありえます｜全体化の要請が、何人かの歴史家や社会学者や心理学者にとって、非常に新しい事であることは｜。

It has been taken for granted by anthropologists ever since they learned it from Malinowski.
それは、マリノフスキーから学んで以来、民族学者にとって、当然のこととうけとられてきました。

But Malinowski's deficiencies have also taught us that this is not where explanation ends.
しかし、マリノフスキーにも欠陥はあり、そこで説明が終わるのではないことは教わっています。

It only begins when we have succeeded in constituting our object.
説明は、(終るのではなく) 始まるのです、私達が、対象の設定に成功したときに。

The role of dialectical reason is to put the human sciences in possession of a reality with which it alone can furnish them,
弁証法的理性の役割は、弁証法的理性のみが人文科学に与えることのできる現実を、人文科学に持たせることです。

but the properly scientific work consists in decomposing and then recomposing on a different plane.
しかし、正当に科学的な仕事は、分解し、そして、別の平面に再構築することにあります。

With all due respect to Sartrian phenomenology, we can hope to fnd in it only a point of departure, not one of arrival.
サルトルの現象学に正当な敬意は払いますが、そこには、到達点ではなく、出発点が見つかる事が望めるだけです。

●Furthermore, dialectical reason must not let itself be carried away by its own elan,
　さらに、弁証法的理性は、みずからの躍動に流されることを許してはいけませんし、

nor must the procedure leading to the comprehension of another reality attribute to it, in addition to its own dialectical features, those appertaining to the procedure rather than to the object :
別の現実の理解に導く手続きが、目的ではなく手続きに付随する特徴を、それ自身の弁証法的特徴に加えて、それのせいにしてはいけません。

it does not follow from the fact that all knowledge of others is dialectical, that others are wholly dialectical in every respect.
他者の知識のすべてが弁証法的であるという事実から、他者がすべての点について全く弁証法的であることにはなりません。

By making analytical reason an anti-comprehension, Sartre often comes to refuse it any reality as an integral part of the object of comprehension.
分析的理性を反理解とすることにより、サルトルは、それに、理解の対象の全体部分としてのどんな現実性も、付与することを拒否します。

This paralogism is already apparent in his manner of invoking history,
この誤謬推理は、歴史を呼び起こす彼のやり方の中に、すでに明らかです、

for one is hard put to it to see whether it is meant to be the history men make unconsciously, history of men consciously made by historians, the philosopher's interpretation of the history of men or his interpretation of the history of historians.
というのは、人は、それが人類が無意識に作る歴史なのか、歴史家が意識的に作る人類の歴史なのか、哲学者の解釈する人類の歴史なのか、彼の解釈する歴史家の歴史なのかを理解するのが困難だからです。

The difficulty becomes even greater, however, when Sartre endeavours to explain the life and thought of the present or past members not of his own society but of exotic societies.
しかし、困難はさらに大きくなります、サルトルが、彼自身の社会ではなく、異文化社会の現在または過去のメンバーの生活や思想を説明しようと努めるときに。

●He thinks, rightly, that this attempted comprehension stands no chance of succeeding unless it is dialectical ;
　サルトルは正しい｜この試みられた理解は、それが弁証法的でない限り成功のチャンスはないと考えるのは｜。

and he concludes, wrongly, that the relationship between native thought and his knowledge of it, is that of a constitutive to a constituted dialectic,
サルトルは、間違っている｜土着の思考と、それについての彼の知識の間の関係は、構成する弁証法と構成された弁証法の関係であると結論するのは｜、

and thus, by an unforeseen detour, he repeats all the illusions of theorists of primitive mentality on his own account.
そして、予期しない回り道を歩むことによって、サルトルは、繰り返しているのです｜原始的メンタリティの思想家達のあらゆる錯覚を自分自身のために｜。

It seems even less tolerable to him than to Levy-Bruhl that the savage should possess 'complex understanding' and should be capable of analysis and demonstration.
サルトルにとっては、レヴィ･ブリュールにとってよりも、我慢できないことのようです｜野生の人達が「複雑な理解力」を保持し、分析や論証の能力を持っているということは｜。

Of the Ambrym native, made famous by Deacon's work, who was able to show the field-worker the functioning of his marriage rules and kinship system by a diagram in the sand (an aptitude in no way exceptional as plenty of similar cases are recorded in ethnographic literature) Sartre says :
ディーコンの研究で有名になった、アンブリム島の現地人は、フィールドワーカーのディーコンに、婚姻規則や親族システムの働きを、砂に描いた図で示すことができましたが (その才能は決して例外的ではありません、民族誌の文献には同様のケースが沢山記録されています)
そのアンブリム島の現地人について、サルトルは語ります：

'It goes without saying that this construction is not a thought : it is a piece of manual work governed by unexpressed synthetical knowledge' (p. 505).
「間違いなく、この構築(construction)は、思考ではない、この構築は、表現されていない綜合的な知識によって支配された手作業の一つにすぎない。」

Granted : but then the same must be said of a professor at the EcolePolytechnique demonstrating a proof on the blackboard,
認めましょう、しかし、それなら、同じことが語られなければなりません、エコール･ポリテクニーク(理工科学校)の教授が黒板に証明を書いていることにも、

for every ethnographer capable of dialectical comprehension is intimately persuaded that the situation is exactly the same in both cases.
何故なら、弁証法的理解ができる民族誌家ならみんな、心底納得しています｜状況は、二つのケースにおいて全く同じであることに｜。

So it would follow that all reason is dialectical, which for my part I am prepared to concede, since dialectical reason seems to me like analytical reason in action ;
すると、すべての理性は弁証法的だということになります、それについて、私も、譲歩する用意はあります、何故なら、弁証法的理性は、私にとって、活動している分析的理性のようなものですから、

but then the distinction between the two forms of reason which is the basis of Sartre's enterprise would become pointless.
しかし、その時、サルトルが企てていることの基礎をなしている理性の二つの形の間の区別は、無意味となります。

●I must now confess to having myself unintentionally and unwittingly lent support to these erroneous ideas, by having seemed all too often in Les structures elementaires de la parente as if I were seeking out an unconscious genesis of matrimonial exchange.
　私は今、告白しなければなりません、私自身、これらの誤った考えを意図せずうっかりと支持してしまったことを｜「親族の基本構造」においてあまりにもしばしば、私が、まるで婚姻交換の無意識的な起源を探し出したかのようにみえることにより｜。

I should have made more distinction between exchange as it is expressed spontaneously and forcefully in the praxis of groups and the conscious and deliberate rules by which these same groups - or their philosophers - spend their time in codifying and controlling it.
私はもっと区別すべきでした｜集団のプラクシス(実践)の中に自発的で強引に現れる交換と、その集団や、その識者が、時間をかけてその交換を法制化し規制する意識的で慎重な規則とを｜。

If there is anything to be learnt from the ethnographic enquiries of the last twenty years, it is that this latter aspect is much more important than has generally been realized by observers, who labour under the same delusion as Sartre.
もし、過去20年間の民族誌的調査から学ぶべきものがあるとすれば、それは、この後者の側面が、ずっと重要だということです｜サルトルと同じ妄想にとらわれた研究者達が考えてきたよりも｜。

Thus we must, as Sartre advocates, apply dialectical reason to the knowledge of our own and other societies.
従って、私達は、サルトルが説くように、弁証法的理性を、我々自身の社会にも、他の社会にも適用しなければなりません。

But we must not lose sight of the fact that analytical reason occupies a considerable place in all of them and that, as it is present, the approach we adopt must also allow us to rediscover it there.
しかし私達は、見失ってはいけません｜分析的理性がすべての社会において重要な地位を占めているという事実と、分析的理性が存在するのだから、私達が採用する研究手法は、それがそこにあることを再発見できるものでなければならないという事実を｜。

●But even were it not present, Sartre's position would not be improved.
　しかし、仮に分析的理性が存在しないとしたところで、サルトルの立場が改善するわけではない。

For in this case exotic societies would merely confront us, in a more general manner than others, with an unconscious teleology, which, although historical, completely eludes human history :
というのは、この場合、異質な社会は、他の社会よりもより一般的なやり方で、無意識の目的論で、我々と対峙するだけです、無意識の目的論は、歴史的であるにも関わらず、人間の歴史をかいくぐります：

that of which certain aspects are revealed by linguistics and psycho-analysis and which rests on the interplay of biological mechanisms (structure of the brain, lesions, internal secretions) and psychological ones.
無意識の目的論、その或るいくつかの面は、言語学や精神分析学によって解明され、生物学的メカニズム(脳の構造、病変、内分泌)と心理学的メカニズムの相互作用に基礎をおきます。

There, it seems to me, is 'the bone' (to borrow a phrase from Sartre) which his critique does not manage to break, and moreover cares nothing about, which is the most serious charge one could level at it.
私が思うに、(サルトルの表現を借りると)「骨」があり、サルトルの批判は、それをどうしても破壊できず、もっというと、頓着しない、このことは、それに向けられることのできる最も辛辣な非難です。

説明　critique は、カントの純粋理性批判 のように 批判 と訳されますが、否定的な意味の批判ではなく、批評、論評の意味です。

For language does not consist in the analytical reason of the old-style grammarians nor in the dialectic constituted by structural linguistics nor in the constitutive dialectic of individual praxis facing the practico-inert, since all three presuppose it.

Linguistics thus presents us with a dialectical and totalizing entity but one outside (or beneath) consciousness and will. Language, an unreflecting totalization, is human reason which has its reasons and of which man knows nothing.

And if it is objected that it is so only for a subject who internalizes it on the basis of linguistic theory, my reply is that this way out must be refused, for this subject is one who speaks : f

or the same light which reveals the nature of language to him also reveals to him that it was so when he did not know it, for he already made himself understood, and that it will remain so tomorrow without his being aware of it, since his discourse never was and never will be the result of a conscious totalization of linguistic laws.

But if, as speaking subject, man can find his apodictic experience in an other totalization, there seems no longer any reason why, as living subject, he should not have access to the same experience in other, not necessarily human, but living beings.

●This method could also lay claim to the name 'progressive-regressive';

in fact, what Sartre describes as such is the very method anthropologists have been practising for many years.

But Sa1i:re restricts it to its preliminary step.

For our method is progressiveregressive not once but twice over.

In the first stage, we observe the datum of experience, analyse it in the present, try to grasp its historical antecedents as far as we can delve into the past, and bring all these facts back to the light of day to incorporate them into a meaningful totality.

The second stage, which repeats the first on a different plane and at a different level, then begins.

This internalized human thing which we have sought to provide with all its wealth and originality, only fixes the distance analytical reason must cover, the leap it must make, to close the gap between the ever unforeseen complexity of this new object and the intellectual means at its disposal.

It must therefore transform itself as dialetical reason, in the hope that once flexible, widened and strengthened, by its agency this unforeseen object will be assimilated to others, this novel totality will be merged into other totalities and that thus little by little clambering on to the mass of its conquests, dialectical reason will descry other horizons and other objects.

No doubt the procedure would go astray if it were not, at every stage and, above all, when it seemed to have run its course, ready to retrace its steps and to double back on itself to preserve the contact with that experienced totality which serves both as its end and means.

This return on itself is in my view a verification, rather than, as Sartre regards it, a demonstration, for, as I see it, a conscious being aware of itself as such poses a problem to which it provides no solution.

The discovery of the dialectic subjects analytical reason to an imperative requirement : to account also for dialectical reason.

This standing requirement relentlessly forces analytical reason to extend its programme and transform its axiomatic.

But dialectical reason can account neither for itself nor for analytical reason.

●It will be objected that this expansion is illusory since it is always accompanied by a contraction in meaning, and we should abandon the substance for the shadow, clarity for obscurity, the manifest for the conjectural, truth for science fiction (Sartre, p. 129).

Again, Sartre would have to show that he himself avoids this dilemma, inherent in every attempt at explanation.

The real question is not whether our endeavour to understand involves a gain or a loss of meaning, but whether the meaning we preserve is of more value than that we have been judicious enough to relinquish.

In this respect Sartre seems to have remembered only half of Marx's and Freud's combined lesson.

They have taught us that man has meaning only on the condition that he view himself as meaningful.

So far I agree with Sartre.

But it must be added that this meaning is never the right one : superstructures are fa ulty acts which have 'made it' socially.

Hence it is vain to go to historical consciousness for the truest meaning.

What Sartre calls dialectical reason is only a reconstruction, by what he calls analytical reason, of hypothetical moves about which it is impossible to know - unless one should perform them without thinking them - whether they bear any relation at all to what he tells us about them and whi ch, if so, would be definable in terms of analytical reason alone.

And so we end up in the paradox of a system which invokes the criterion of historical consciousness to distinguish the 'primitive' from the 'civi lized' but - contrary to its claim - is itself ahistorical .

It offers not a concrete image of history but an abstract schema of men making history of such a kind that it can manifest itself in the trend of their lives as a synchronic totality. Its position in relation to history is therefore the same as that of primitives to the eternal past : in Sartre's system, history plays exactly the part of a myth.

●Indeed, the problem raised by the Critique de la raison dia lectique is reducible to the question : under what conditions is the myth of the French Revolution possible?

And I am prepared to grant that the contemporary Frenchman must believe in this myth in order fu lly to play the part of an historical agent and also that Sartre's analysis admirably extracts the set of formal conditions necessary if this result is to be secured.

But it does not fo llow that his meaning, just because it is the richest (and so most suited to inspire practical action), should be the truest.

Here the dialectic turns against itself.

This truth is a matter of context, and if we place ourselves outside it - as the man of science is bound to do - what appeared as an experienced truth first becomes confused and finally disappears altogether.

The so-called men of the Left still cling to a period of contemporary history which bestowed the blessing of a congruence between practical imperatives and schemes of interpretation.

Perhaps this golden age of historical consciousness has already pass ed ; and that this eventuality can at any rate be envisaged proves that what we have here is only a contingent context like the fo rtuitous 'focusing' of an optical instrument when its object-glass and eye-piece move in relation to each other.

We are still 'in fo cus' so far as the French Revolution is concerned, but so we should have been in relation to the Fronde had we lived earlier.

The fo rmer will rapidly cease to afford a coherent image on which our action can be modelled, just as the latter has already done.

What we learn from reading Retz is that thought is powerless to extract a scheme of interpretation from events long past.

●At first sight, there seems no doubt : on one side the privi leged, on the other the humble and exploited ; how could we hesitate?

We are Frondeurs.

However, the people of Paris were being manoeuvred by noble hous es, whose sole aim was to arrange their own affairs with the existing powers, and by one half of the royal family which wanted to oust the other.

And now we are already only half Frondeurs.

As fo r the Court, which took refuge at Saint-Germain, it appears at first to have been a fa ction of good for nothings vegetating on their privileges and growing fat on exactions and usury at the expense of the collectivity.

But no, it had a fu nction all the same since it retained military power ;

it conducted the struggle against foreigners, the Spaniards, whom the Frondeurs invited without hesitation to invade the country and impose their wills on this same Court which was defending the fat herland.

The scales, however, tilt the other way again : the Frondeurs and Spaniards together fo rmed the party of peace.

The Prince de Conde and the Court only sought warlike adventures. We are pacifists and once again become Frondeurs.

But nevertheless did not the military exploits of Mazarin and the Court extend France to its present fr ontiers, thus fo unding the state and the nation ?

Without them we should not be what we are today. So here we are on the other side again.

●It suffices therefore for history to move away from us in time or for us to move away from it in thought, for it to cease to be internalizable and to lose its intelligibility, a spurious intelligibility attaching to a temporary internality.

I am not however suggesting that man can or should sever himself fr om this internality.

It is not in his power to do so and wisdom consists for him in seeing himself live it, while at the same time knowing (but in a different register) that what he lives so completely and intensely is a myth - which will appear as such to men of a fu ture century, and perhaps to himself a few years hence, and will no longer appear at all to men of a future millenium.

All meaning is answerable to a lesser meaning, which gives it its highest meaning, and if this regression finally ends in recognizing 'a contingent law of which one can say only :

it is thus, and not otherwise' (Sartre, p. 128), this prospect is not alarming to those whose thought is not tormented by transcendence even in a latent fo rm.

For man will have gained all he can reasonably hope for if, on the sole condition of bowing to this contingent law, he succeeds in determining his form of conduct and in placing all else in the realm of the intelligible.

●Sartre is certainly not the only contemporary philosopher to have valued history above the other human sciences and formed an almost mystical conception of it.

The anthropologist respects history, but he does not accord it a special value.

He conceives it as a study complementary to his own :

one of them unfurls the range of human societies in time, the other in space.

And the difference is even less great than it might seem, since the historian strives to reconstruct the picture of vanished societies as they were at the points which for them corresponded to the present, while the ethnographer does his best to reconstruct the historical stages which temporally preceded their existing form.

●This symmetry between history and anthropology seems to be rejected by philosophers who implicitly or explicitly deny that distribution in space and succession in time afford equivalent perspectives.

In their eyes some special prestige seems to attach to the temporal dimension, as if di achrony were to establish a kind of intelligibility not merely superior to that provided by synchrony, but above all more specifically human .

●It is easy to explain, if not to justify, this preference.

The diversity of social fo rms, which the anthropologist grasps as deployed in space, present the appearance of a discontinuous system.

Now, thanks to the temporal dimension, history seems to restore to us, not separate states, but the passage fr om one state to another in a continuous form.

And as we believe that we apprehend the trend of our personal history as a continuous change, historical knowledge appears to confirm the evidence of inner sense.

History seems to do more than describe beings to us from the outside, or at best give us intermittent flashes of insight into internalities, each of which are so on their own account while remaining external to each other :

it appears to re-establish our connection, outside ourselves, with the very essence of change.

●There would be plenty to say about this supposed totalizing continuity of the self which seems to me to be an illusion sustained by the demands of social life - and consequently a reflection of the external on the internal - rather than the obj ect of an apodictic experience.

But there is no need to resolve this philosophical problem in order to perceive that the proposed conception of history corresponds to no kind of reality.

As historical knowledge is claimed to be privileged, I feel entitled (as I would not otherwise feel) to
make the point that there is a twofold antinomy in the very notion of an historical fact.

For,. ex hypothesi, a historical fact is what really took place, but where did anythmg take place ?

Each episode in a revolution or a war resolves itself into a multitude of individual psychic movements.

Each of these movements is the translation of unconscious development, and these resolve themselves into cerebral,
hormonal or nervous phenomena, which themselves have reference to the physical or chemical order.

Consequently, historical facts are no more given than any other.

It is the historian or the agent of history, who constitutes them by abstraction and as though under the threat of an infinite regress.

●What is true of the constitution of historical facts is no less so of their selection.

From this point of view, the historian and the agent of htstory choose, sever and carve them up, for a truly total history would confront them with chaos.

Every corner of space conceals a multitude of individuals each of whom totalizes the trend of history in a manner which cannot be compared to the others ;

for any one of these individuals: each moment of. time is inexhaustibly rich in phystcal and psychical incidents which all play their part in his totalization.

Even history which claims to be universal is still only a juxtaposition of a few local histories within which (and between whtch) very much more is left out than is put in.

And it would be vain to hope that by increasing the number of collaborators and making research more intensive one would obtain a better result.

In so far as history aspires to meaning, it is doomed to select regions, periods groups of men and individuals in these groups and to make them stand out, as discontinuous figures, against a continuity barely good enough to be.used as a backdrop.

A truly total history would cancel itself out - its product would be nought .

What makes history posstble is that a sub-set of events is found, for a given period, to have approximately the same significance for a contingent of individuals who have not necessarily experienced the events and may even consider them at an mterval of several centuries.

History is therefore never history, but history-for.*

* Quite so, will be the comment of the supporters of Sartre.

But the latter's whole endeavour shows that, though the subj ectivity of history-for me can make way for the obj ectivity of history-for-us, the 'I' can still only be converted into 'we' by condemni?-g this 'we' to being no more than an 'I' raised to the power of two, Itself hermetically sealed off from the other 'we's.

The price so paid for the illusion of having overcome the insoluble antinomy (in such a system) between my self and others, consists of the assignation, by historical consciousness, of the metaphysical function of Other to the Papuans.

By reducing the latter to the state of means, barely sufficient for its philosophical appetite, historical reason abandons itself to a sort of intellectual cannibalism much more revolting to the anthropologist than real cannibalism.

It is partial in the sense of being biased even when it claims not to be, for it inevitably remains partial -that is, incomplete - and this is itself a form of partiality .

When one proposes to write a history of the French Revolution one knows (or ought to know) that it cannot, simultaneously and under the same heading, be that of the J acobin and that of the aristocrat.

Ex hypothesi, their respective totalizations (each of which is anti-symmetric to the other) are equally true.

One must therefore choose between two alternatives.

One must select as the principal either one or a third (for there are an infinite number of them) and give up the attempt to find in history a totalization of the set of partial totalizations ; or alternatively one must recognize them all as equally real :

but only to discover that the French Revolution as commonly conceived never took place.

●History does not therefore escape the common obligation of all knowledge, to employ a code to analyse its object, even (and especially) if a continuous reality is attributed to that object.*

* In this sense too, one can speak of an antinomy of historical knowledge :

*if it claims to reach the continuous it is impossible, being condemned to an infinite regress; but to render it possible, events must be quantified and thereafter temporality ceases to be the privileged dimension of historical knowledge because as soon as it is quantified each event can, for all useful purposes, be treated as if it were the result of a choice between possible pre-existents.

The distinctive features of historical knowledge are due not to the absence of a code, which is illusory, but to its particular nature : the code consists in a chronology.

There is no history without dates.

To be convinced of this it is sufficient to consider how a pupil succeeds in learning history : he reduces it to an emaciated body, the skeleton of which is fo rmed by dates.

Not without reason, there has been a reaction against this dry method, but one which often runs to the opposite extr eme.

Dates may not be the whole of history, nor what is most interesting about it, but they are its sine qua non, for history 's entire originality and distinctive nature lie in apprehending the relation between befo re and aft er, which would perforce dissolve if its terms could not, at least in principle, be dated.

●Now, this chronological coding conceals a very much more complex nature than one supposes when one thinks of historical dates as a simple linear series.

In the first place, a date denotes a moment in a succession : d 2 is after d 1 and before d 3.

From this point of view dates only perform the fu nction of ordinal numbers.

But each date is also a cardinal number and, as such, expresses a dis tance in relation to the dates nearest to it.

We use a large number of dates to code some periods of history ; and fewer for others.

This variable quantity of dates applied to periods of equal duration are a gauge of what might be called the pressure of history :

there are 'hot' chronologies which are those of periods where in the eyes of the historian numerous events appear as differential elements ;

others , on the contrary, where for him (although not of course fo rthe men who lived through them) very little or nothing took place.

Thirdly and most important, a date is a member of a class.

These classes of dates are defnable by the meaningfu l character each date has within the class in relation to other dates which also belong to it, and by the absence of this meaningfu l character with respect to dates appertaining to a different class.

Thus the date I 68 5 belongs to a class of which I6Io, 1648 and 1715 are likewise members ;

but it means nothing in relation to the class composed of the dates : 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th millenium, nor does it mean anything in relation to the class of dates : 23 January, I7 August, 30 September, etc.

●On this basis, in what would the historian's code consist?

Certainly not in dates, since these are not recurrent.

Changes of temperature can be coded with the help of figures, because the reading of a figure on the thermometer evokes the return of an earlier situation :

whenever I read 0℃, I know that it is fr eezing and put on my warmest coat.

But a historical date, taken in itself, would have no meaning1 for it has no reference outside itself :

if I know nothing about modern history, the date 1643 makes me none the wiser.

The code can therefore consist only of classes of dates, where each date has meaning in as much as it stands in complex relations of correlation and opposition with other dates.

Each class is defined by a fr equency, and derives from what might be called a corpus or a domain of history.

Historical knowledge thus proceeds in the same way as a wireless with frequency modulation :

like a nerve, it codes a continuous quantity - and as such an asymbolic one - by fre quencies of impulses proportional to its variations .

As for history itself, it cannot be represented as an aperiodic series with only a fragment of which we are acquainted.

History is a discontinuous set composed of domains of history, each of which is defined by a characteristic frequency and by a differential coding of before and after.

It is no more possible to pass between the dates which compose the different domains than it is to do so between natural and irrational numbers.

Or more precisely: the dates appropriate to each class are irrational in relation to all those of other classes.

●It is thus not only fallacious but contradictory to conceive of the historical process as a continuous development, beginning with prehistory coded in tens or hundreds of millenia, then adopting the scale of millenia when it gets to the 4th or 3rd millenium, and continuing as history in centuries interlarded, at the pleasure of each author, with slices of annual history within the century, day to day history within the year or even hourly history within a day.

All these dates do not form a series: they are of different species.

To give just one example, the coding we use in prehistory is not preliminary to that we employ for modern and contemporary history.

Each code refers tp a system of meaning which is, at least in theory, applicable to the virtual totality of human history.

The events which are significant for one code are no longer so for another.

Coded in the system of prehistory, the most famous episodes in modern and contemporary history cease to be pertinent;

except perhaps (and again we know nothing about it) certain massive aspects of demographic evolution viewed on a world-wide scale, the invention of the steam-engine, the discovery of electricity and of nuclear energy.

●Given that the general code consists not in dates which can be ordered as a linear series but in classes of dates each functioning an autonomous system of reference, the discontinuous and classficatory nature of historical knowledge emerges clearly.

It operates by means of a rectangular matrix:

   ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ 　　

   ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ 　　

   ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ 　　

   ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ 　　

   ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ ・ 　　

where each line represents classes of dates, which may be called hourly, daily, annual, millenial for the purposes of schematization and which together make up a discontinuous set.

In a system of this type, alleged historical continuity is secured only by dint of fraudulent outlines.

●Furthermore, although the internal gaps in each class cannot be filled in by recourse to other classes, each class taken as a whole nevertheless always refers back to another class, which contains the principle of an intelligibility to which it could itself aspire. 

The history of the 17-th century is 'annual' but the 17-th century, as a domain of history belongs to another class, which codes it in relation to earlier and later centuries; and this domain of modern times in its true becomes an element of a class where it appears correlated with and opposed to the other 'times': the middle ages, antiquity, the present day, etc. 

Now, these various domains correspond to histories of different power. 

●Biographical and anecdotal history, right at the bottom of the scale, is low-powered history, which is not intelligible in itself and only becomes so when it is tranderred en bloc to a form of history of a higher power thna itself;

and the latter stands in the same relation to a class above it.

It would, however, be a mistake to think that we progressively reconstitute a total history by dint of these dovetailings.

For any gain on one side is offset by a loss on the other.

Biographical and anecdotal history is the least explanatory;

but it is the richest in point of information, for it considers individuals in their particularity and details for each of them the shades of character, the twists and turns of their motives, the phases of their deliberations.

This information is schematized, put in the background and finally done away as one passes to histories of progressively greater 'power'.*

*Each domain of history is circumscribed in relation to that immediately below it, inscribed in relation to that above it. 

*So each loe-powered history of an inscribed domain is complementary to the powerful history of this same domain (in so far as it is itself an inscribed domain). 

*Each history is thus accompanied by an indeterminate number of anti-histories, each complementary to the others: to
a history of grade 1, there corresponds an anti-history of grade 2, etc. 

*The progress of knowledge and the creation of new sciences take place through the generation of anti-histories which show that a certain order which is possible only on one place ceases to be so on another. 

*The anti-history of the French Revolution envisaged by Gobineau is contradictory on the plane on which the
Revolution had been thought of before him. 

*It becomes logically conceivable (which does not mean that it is true) if one puts oneself on a new plane, which
incidentally Gobineau chose clumsily ; that is to say :

*if one passes from a history of 'annual' or 'secular' grade (which is also political , social and ideological) to a history of 'millenia!' or 'multi-millenial' grade (which is also cultural and anthropological), a procedure not invented by Gobineau which might be called : Boulainvilliers ' 'transformation'. 

Consequently, depending on the level on which he places himself, the historian loses in information what he gains in comprehension or vice versa, as if the logic of the concrete wished to remind us of its logical nature by modelling a confused outline of Godel's theorem in the clay of 'becoming' .

The historian's relative choice, with respect to each domain of history he gives up, is always confined to the choice between history which teaches us more and explains less, and history which explains more and teaches less.

The only way he can avoid the dilemma is by getting outside history :

either by the bottom, if the pursuit of information leads him from the consideration of groups to that of individuals and then to their motivations which depend on their personal history and temperament, that is to say to an infra-historical domain in the realms of psychology and physiology;

or by the top, if the need to understand incites him to put history back into prehistory and the latter into the general evolution of organized beings, which is itself explicable only in terms of biology, geology and finally cosmology.

●There is, however , another way of avoiding the dilemma without thereby doing away with history .

We need only recognize that history is a method with no distinct object corresponding to it to reject the equivalence between the notion of history and the notion of humanity which some have tried to fo ist on us with the unavowed aim of making historicity the last refuge of a transcendental humanism : as if men could regain the illusion of liberty on the plane of the 'we' merely by giving up the 'I's that are too obviously wanting in consistency.

●In fact history is tied neither to man nor to any particular object.

It consists wholly in its method, which experience proves to be indispensable for cataloguing the elements of any structure whatever, human or non-human, in their entirety .

It is therefore far from being the case that the search fo r intelligibility comes to an end in history as though this were its terminus .

Rather, it is history that serves as the point of departure in any quest fo r intelligibility.

As we say of certain careers, history may lead to anything, provided you get out of it.

●This further thing to which history leads for want of a sphere of reference of its own shows that whatever its value (which is indisputable) historical knowledge has no claim to be opposed to other forms of knowledge as a supremely privileged one.

We noted above• that it is already found rooted in the savage mind , and wo cnn now see why it does not come to fruition there.

The characteristic feature of the savage mind is its timelessness ;

its object is to grnep tho wol'ld as both a synchronic and a diachronic totality and tho knowledge which it draws therefrom is like that afforded of a room by mirror•fixed on opposite walls, which reflect each other (as well as object& in the intervening space) although without being strictly parallel.

A multitude of images forms simultaneously, none exactly like any other, so that no single one fu rnishes more than a partial knowledge of the decoration and fu rniture but the group is characterized by invariant properties expressing a truth.

The savage mind deepens its knowledge with the help of imagines mundi.

It builds mental structures which fa cilitate an understanding of the world in as much as they resemble it. In this sense savage thought can be defined as analogical thought.

●But in this sense too it differs from domesticated thought, of which historical knowledge constitutes one aspect.

The concern for continuity which inspires the latter is indeed a manifestation, in the temporal order, of knowledge which is interstitial and unifying rather than discontinuous and analogical :

instead of multiplying objects by schemes promoted to the role of additional objects, it seems to transcend an original discontinuity by relating objects to one another.

But it is this reason, wholly concerned with closing gaps and dissolving differences, which can properly be called 'analytical'.

By a paradox on which much stress has recently been laid, for modern thought 'continuity, variability, relativity, determinism go together' (Auger, p. 475).

●This analytic, abstract continuity will doubtless be opposed to that of the praxis as concrete individuals live it.

But this latter continuity seems no less derivative than the fo rmer, fo r it is only the conscious mode of apprehending psychological and physiological processes which are themselves discontinuous.

I am not disputing that reason develops and transforms itself in the practical field :

man's mode of thought reflects his relations to the world and to men.

But in order for praxis to be living thought, it is necessary first (in a logical and not a historical sense) for thought to exist : that is to say, its initial conditions must be given in the fo rm of an objective structure of the psyche and brain without which there would be neither praxis nor thought.

●When therefore I describe savage thought as a system of concepts embedded in images, I do not come anywhere near the robinsonnades* (Sartre, pp. 642-3) of a constitutive constituent dialectic : all constitutive reason presupposes a constituted reason.

* This term alludes to Robinson Crusoe and the Swiss family Robinson whose 'creation' of civilization was not a genuine invention but merely an application of their pre-existing knowledge. [Trans. note.]

But even if one allowed Sartre the circularity which he invokes to dispel the 'suspect character' attaching to the first stages of his synthesis, what he proposes really are 'robinsonnades', this time in the guise of descriptions of phenomena, when he claims to restore the sense of marriage exchange, the potlatch or the demonstration of his tribe's marriage rules by a Melanesian savage.

Sartre then refers to a comprehension which has its being in the praxis of their organizers, a bizarre expression to which no reality corresponds, except perhaps the capacity which any foreign society presents to anyone looking at it from the outside, and which leads him to project the lacunae in his own observation on to it in the form of positive attributes.

Two examples will show what I mean.

●No anthropologist can fail to be struck by the common manner of conceptualizing initiation rites employed by the most diverse societies throughout the world.

Whether in Africa, America, Australia or Melanesia, the rites follow the same pattern : first, the novices, taken from their parents, are symbolically 'killed' and kept hidden in the forest or bush where they are put to the test by the Beyond ; after this they are 'reborn' as members of the society.

When they are returned to their natural parents, the latter therefore simulate all the phases of a new delivery, and begin a re-education even in the elementary actions of feeding or dressing.

It would be tempting to interpret this set of phenomena as a proof that at this stage thought is wholly embedded in praxis.

But this would be seeing things back to front, for it is on the contrary scientific praxis which, among ourselves, has emptied the notions of death and birth of everything not corresponding to mere physiological processes and rendered them unsuitable to convey other meanings.

In societies with initiation rites, birth and death provide the material for a rich and varied conceptualization, provided that these notions (like so many others) have not been stripped by any form of scientific knowledge oriented towards practical returns-which they lack -of the major part of a meaning which transcends the distinction between the real and the imaginary : a complete meaning of which we can now hardly do more than evoke the ghost in the reduced setting of figurative language.

What looks to us like being embedded in praxis is the mark of thought which quite genuinely takes the words it uses seriously, whereas in comparable circumstances we only 'play' on words.

●The taboos on parents-in-law furnish the matter for a cautionary tale leading to the same conclusion by a different route.

Anthropologists have found the frequent prohibition of any physical or verbal contact between close affines so strange that they have exercised their ingenuity in multiplying explanatory hypotheses, without always making sure that the hypotheses are not rendered redundant by one another.

Elkin for instance explains the rarity of marriage with the patrilateral cousin in Australia by the rule that as a man has to avoid any contact with his mother-in-law, he will be wise to choose the latter among women entirely outside his own local group (to which his father's sisters belong).

The aim of the rule itself is supposed to be to prevent a mother and daughter from being rivals for the affections of the same man ;

finally, the taboo is supposed to be extended by contamination to the wife's maternal grandmother and her husband.

There are thus four concurrent interpretations of a single phenomenon : as a function of a type of marriage, as the result of a psychological calculation, as protection against instinctive tendencies and as the product of association by contiguity. This, however, still does not satisfy Elkin, for in his view the taboo on the father-in -law rests on a fifth explanation : the fatherin-law is the creditor of the man to whom he has given his daughter, and the son-in-law feels himself to be in a position of inferiority in relation to him (Elkin 4, pp. 66-7, 1 17-20 ).

●I shall content myself with the last explanation which perfectly covers all the cases considered and renders the others worthless by bringing out their naivety.

But why is it so difficult to put these usages into their proper place?

The reason is, I think, that the usages of our own society which could be compared with them and might furnish a landmark to identify them by, are in a dissociated form among ourselves, while in these exotic societies they appear in an associated one which makes them unrecognizable to us.

●We are acquainted with the taboo on parents-in-law or at least with its approximate equivalent.

By the same token we are forbidden to address the great of this world and obliged to keep out of their way. All protocol asserts it :

one does not speak first to the Queen of England or the President of the French Republic;

and we adopt the same reserve when unforeseen circumstances create conditions of closer proximity between a superior and ourselves than the social distance between us warrants.

Now, in most societies the position of wife-giver is accompanied by social (and sometimes also economic) superiority, that of wife-taker by inferiority and dependence.

This inequality between affine& may be expressed objectively in institutions as a fluid or stable hierarchy, or it may be expressed subjectively in the system of interpersonal relations by means of privileges and prohibitions.

●There is therefore nothing mysterious about these usages which our own experience enables us to see from the inside.

We are disconcerted only by their constitutive conditions, different in each case.

Among ourselves, they are sharply separated fr om other usages and tied to an unambiguous context.

In exotic societies, the same usages and the same context are as it were embedded in other usages and a different context : that of family ties, with which they seem to us incompatible.

We find it hard to imagine that, in private, the son-inlaw of the President of the French Republic should regard him as the head of the state rather than as his father-in-law.

And although the Queen of England's husband may behave as the first of her subj ects in public, there are good reasons for supposin,g that he is just a husband when they are alone together.

It is either one or the other . The superficial strangeness of the taboo on parents-in-law arises from its being both at the same time.

●Consequently, and as we have already found in the case of operations of understanding, the system of ideas and attitudes is here presented only as embodied.

Considered in itself, this system has nothing about it to baffie the anthropologist.

My relation to the President of the Republic is made up entirely of negative observances, since, in the absence of other ties, any relations we may have are wholly defined by the rule that I shou ld not speak unless he invites me to do so and that I should remain a respectful distance from him.

But this abstract relation need only be clothed in a concrete relation and the attitudes appropriate to each to accumulate, for me to find myself as embarrassed by my family as an Australian aborigine.

What appears to us as greater social ease and greater intellectual mobility is thus due to the fact that we prefer to operate with detached pieces, if not indeed with 'small chango ', while the native is a logical hoarder :

he is forever tying the threads, unceasingly turning over all the aspects of reality, whether physical, ·social or mental .

We traffic in our ideas ; he hoards them up.

The savage mind puts a philosophy of the finite into practice.

●This is also the source of the renewe d interest in it.

This language with its limited vocabulary able to express any message by combinations of oppositions between its constitutive units, this logic of comprehension for which contents are indissociable from fo rm, this systematic of finite classes, this universe made up of meanings, no longer app ears to us as retrospective witnesses of a time when : ' ... le ciel sur la terre Marchait et respirait dans un peuple de dieux', * and which the poet only evokes for the purpose of asking whether or not it is to be regretted.

* i.e. 'when heaven walked and breathed on earth among a population of Gods'. From A. de Musset 'Rolla' 1833 reprinted in Poesies Nouvelles. [Trans. note.]

This time is now restored to us, thanks to the discovery of a universe of information where the laws of savage thought reign once more : 'heaven' too, 'walking on earth' among a population of transmitters and receivers whose messages, while in transmission, constitute obj ects of the physical world and can be grasped both from without and from within.

●The idea that the universe of primitives (or supposedly such) consists principally in messages is not new.

But until recently a negative value was attributed to what was wrongly taken to be a distinctive characteristic, as though this difference between the universe of the primitives and our own contained the explanation of their mental and technological inferiority, when what it does is rather to put them on a par with modern theorists of documentati on. *

* The documentalist neither disallows nor disputes the substance of the works he analyses in order to derive the constitutive units of his code or to adapt them, either by corr:bmmg them among themselves or, if necessary, decomposing them mto finer units.

* He thus treats the authors as gods whose revelations are written down, instead of being inscribed into beings and things, but which hnvo the same sacred value, which attaches to the supremely meaningful chm·ncter that, for methodological or ontological reasons, it is ex hypothesi necessary to recognize in them in both cases.

Physical science had to discover that a semantic universe possesses all the characteristics of an object in its own right for it to be recognized that the manner in which primitive peoples conceptualize their world is not merely coherent but the very one demanded in the case of an object whose elementary structure presents the picture of a discontinuous complexity.

●The false antinomy between logical and prelogical mentality was surmounted at the same time.

The savage mind is logical in the same sense and the same fashion as ours, though as our own is only when it is applied to knowledge of a universe in which it recognizes physical and semantic properties simultaneously.

This misunderstanding once dispelled, it remains no less true that, contrary to Levy-Bruhl's opinion, its thought proceeds through understanding, not affectivity, with the aid of distinctions and oppositions, not by confusion and participation. Although the term had not yet come into use, numerous texts of Durkheim and Mauss show that they understood that so-called primitive thought is a quantified form of thought.

●It will be objected that there remains a major difference between the thought of primitives and our own :

Information Theory is concerned with genuine messages whereas primitives mistake mere manifestations of physical determinism for messages.

Two considerations, however, deprive this argument of any weight.

In the first place, Information Theory has been generalized, and it extends to phenomena not intrinsically possessing the character of messages, notably to those of biology ; the illusions of totemism have had at least the merit of illuminating the fundamental place belonging to phenomena of this order, in the internal economy of systems of classification. In treating the sensible properties of the animal and plant kingdoms as if they were the elements of a message, and in discovering 'signatures' - and so signs - in them, men have made mistakes of identification : the meaningful element was not always the one they supposed. But, without perfected instruments which would have permitted them to place it where it most often is - namely, at the microscopic level - they already discerned ' as through a glass darkly' principles of interpretation whose heuristic value and accordance with reality have been revealed to us only through very recent inventions : telecommunications, computers and electron microscopes.

●Above all, during the period of their transmission, when they have an objective existence outside the consciousness of transmitters and receivers, messages display properties which they have in common with the physical world.

Hence, despite their mistakes with regard to physical phenomena (which were not absolute but relative to the level where they grasped them) and even though they interpreted them as if they were messages, men were nevertheless able to arrive at some of their properties.

For a theory of information to be able to be evolved it was undoubtedly essential to have discovered that the universe of information is part of an aspect of the natural world.

But the validity of the passage from the laws of nature to those of information once demonstrated, implies the validity of the reverse passage - that which for millenia has allowed men to approach the laws of nature by way of information.

Certainly the properties to which the savage mind has access are not the same as those which have commanded the attention of scientists.

The physical world is approached from opposite ends in the two cases : one is supremely concrete, the other supremely abstract ; one proceeds from the angle of sensible qualities and the other from that of fo rmal properties.

But if, theoretically at least .and on condition no abrupt changes in perspective occurred, these two courses might have been destined to meet, this explains that they should have both, independently of each other in time and space, led to two distinct though equally positive sciences : one which flowered in the neolithic period, whose theory of the sensible order provided the basis of the arts of civilization (agriculture, ammal husbandry, pottery, weaving, conservation and preparation of fo od, etc.) and which continues to provide for our basic needs by these means ; and the other, which places itself from the start at the level of intelligibility, and of which contemporary science is the fruit.

●We have had to wait until the middle of this century for the crossing of long separated paths :
私達は、待たなければなりませんでした、今世紀中旬に、交差するまで｜ながらく分離していた(二つの)道が｜：

that which arrives at the physical world by the detour of communication,
通信の迂回路によって物理の世界(自然界)に到達する道と

and that which as we have recently come to know, arrives at the world of communication by the detour of the physical.
物理の世界の迂回路によって通信の世界に到達するという最近私たちが知ることになった道とが。

The entire process of human knowledge thus assumes the character of a closed system.
人間の知識の全過程は、かくして、閉鎖系の特徴を持つに至ります。

And we therefore remain faithful to the inspiration of the savage mind
その故に、私達は、野生の思考のインスピレーションに忠実に留まるのです

when we recognize that the scientific spirit in its most modern form will, by an encounter it alone could have foreseen, have contributed to legitimize the principles of savage thought and to re-establish it in its rightful place.
私たちが理解したときに｜科学的精神は、その最も現代的な形態において、自らのみが予見できた出会いにより、野生の思考の原理を正当化し、野生の思考をその正当な位置に再び確立することに寄与するであろうことを｜。

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